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Book Review
Race and Races: Constructing a New Legal Actor
RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA.

Edited By Juan F. Pereat Richard Delgado,tt Angela P. Harris,ttt and
Stephanie M. Wildman.tttt
St. Paul: West Group, 2000. Pp. xlix, 1171. $60.00 cloth.
Reviewed by Kathryn Abrams4

INTRODUCTION

One crucial consequence of our classroom pedagogy is the formation
of certain kinds of thinkers and actors. Most of us acknowledge this, in a
general way: our teaching helps students to "think like lawyers." Some
scholars have theorized this thought process more specifically, when they
have written, for example, about the kinds of intellectual habits engendered
through rigorous exposure to the case method,' or the kinds of attitudes
toward hierarchy produced by the substance and method of legal education.2 But what is true of pedagogic methods, such as the Socratic method
or case study, is also true of the texts from which students learn the law.
The kinds of materials students encounter, the questions to which they are
exposed, and the strategies and avenues for producing change with which
they are presented, all contribute to the shaping of an actor who responds in
particular ways to the law, or to the social problems it seeks to address.
Yet the recognition that choices made within casebooks can shape
legal professionals has been slower to emerge, even among those scholars
who have offered radical critiques of the law. Many factors may be responsible, from the institutional caution of casebook publishers to the divided
attention of those seeking to establish the legitimacy of new bodies of legal
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nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their publications.
f
Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Hazouri & Roth Professor of Law, University of Florida.
tt
Jean Lindsley Professor of Law, Univeristy of Colorado.
fft
Professor of Law, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall).
tif f Professor of Law, Santa Clara Law School.
$
Professor of Law, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall); Professor
of Law, Cornell Law School.
1. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BusH (1930).
2. DuNcAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HmRARcHY (1983).

1589

HeinOnline -- 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1589 2001

1590

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:1589

thought.' Even professionalization is likely to have played a role: most
critical scholars were educated through the Socratic presentation of traditional Langdellian case materials. It may therefore have taken us time, and
a full appreciation of the scope of our own critiques, to recognize that approaches that challenge the neutrality of traditional legal decisionmakers,
or characterize law as one among many social structures that embed inequality, demand a different approach to the presentation of legal materials.
For any or all of these reasons, casebooks that seek to foster a more critical
and multidisciplinary understanding of the role of law and the domain of
legal professionals have only gradually begun to appear.'
From this critical, multidisciplinary perspective, the publication of
Race and Races reflects an important achievement. Edited by four distinguished scholars associated with the critical race theory movement, the
casebook does more than compile a wide array of multidisciplinary perspectives on the meanings and consequences of race in American society.
This book seeks to instill in a new generation of professionals a distinct,
nontraditional understanding of the role of law in the genesis and solution
of social problems. Although the book occasionally falls short of its reconstructive pedagogic aspirations, it represents a pathbreaking effort in transforming critical theory into practical, change-oriented pedagogy. In this
respect, the book also reflects a major development in critical race theory
as a body of thought. The increasingly insistent color-blindness of the Supreme Court,5 and the federal courts in general, has raised questions about

3. Beyond the complex task of bringing critical perspectives to scholarship, scholars advocating
systematic change have been concerned with identifying the cases that should supplement existing sets
of materials, compiling anthologies that bring new work to light, and focusing on those aspects of
classroom pedagogy that hinder or facilitate critical thought, or impede or empower certain groups of
students. This last task has been an object of intense focus, spawning numerous articles, conferences
and published symposia. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN (1997); Kimberl6
Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NAT'L
BLACK L.J. 1 (1989); Elizabeth Mertz et al., What Difference Does Difference Make? The Challenge
for Legal Education, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1998); Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal
Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299 (1988); Women in Legal Education-Pedagogy,
Law, Theory and Practice,38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1988).
4. There are, of course, examples of such books. Many of these books are in fields that directly
reflect the critical perspectives of the authors and editors. See e.g., KATHARINE T. BARTLErr &
ANGELA P. HARRIS, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRImNE, COMMENTARY (2d ed. 1998); MARY
BECKER Er AL., FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY (1994); DERRICK A. BELL.
JR., RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW (4th ed. 2000). A few are in more traditional doctrinal fields.
See e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES (2d ed. 1997).
These books include innovations such as extensive explorations of group-based history, multidisciplinary articles and analyses, hypotheticals and role playing exercises that sometimes employ
factual or fictional narratives, and emphasis on nontraditional areas of doctrine or extradoctrinal
influences on law.
5. See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Shaw v. Reno 509
U.S. 630 (1993); City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).

HeinOnline -- 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1590 2001

2001]

A NEWLEGAL ACTOR

1591

the direction of "critical race praxis."6 It has challenged critical race theorists to consider how they can intervene under circumstances in which
courts are unlikely to heed their message, and how critical race theory can
serve, more broadly, as an instrument for achieving racial equality.7 Race
and Races responds to this challenge with a vision of a legal professional
whose understanding of salient social problems is only partly constituted
by dominant legal understandings, and who views the courts and doctrinal
intervention as only one among several strategies for producing change.
This plural strategy of engaging with, while striving to decenter, legal doctrine may set a crucial course for critical intervention in the coming years.
In this essay, I will describe the pedagogic innovations introduced by Race
and Races, and the kind of legal actor they envision and help to produce. I
will also explore certain ways in which these innovations proved unsatisfying, and highlight changes or new directions which might strengthen
subsequent editions.

The conventional legal casebook seeks to introduce students to a substantively discrete body of law. In the broadly realist tradition perhaps best
articulated by Karl Llewellyn, most casebooks do not aim simply to introduce students to the prevailing rules: they seek to offer students a rich
enough sense of the contextual operation of those rules to engender an understanding of how legal decisionmakers will respond in future cases.8
Notwithstanding this postformalist emendation, the lawyer's role, to which
students are socialized through this approach, is predictive, accomodative,
and persuasive. Students may be encouraged to press the limits of the doctrinal logic, or probe the intellectual developments through which it has
emerged, but systematic challenge to or disruption of the dominant doctrinal framework is not the order of the day. The task of the legal professional is to anticipate the likely scope of the court's response, so as to be
able to characterize the client's case favorably, or produce an incremental
doctrinal movement that will insure victory.

6. For discussions of this term and/or the challenges it reflects, see Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical
Race Praxis: Race Theory and PoliticalLawyering Practicein Post-CivilRights America, 95 MICH. L.
REv. 821 (1997). See also Anthony V. Alfieri, Black and White, 85 CALIF. L. REv. 1647, 1648 (1997)
(using term "Critical Race praxis"); Angela Harris, Race Theory in ContemporaryLegal Thought, in
Co Trr.oRARY LEGAL THEORY (Robert Gordon & Margaret Jane Radin, eds.) (forthcoming 2002)
(using similar term "critical race practice").
7. One of the most radical responses to this challenge is Derrick Bell's Racial Realism, which
begins from a stark recognition that the law relating to inequality is unlikely to provide the means of
achieving racial equality in our society. Derrick Bell, RacialRealism, 24 CONN.L. REv. 363 (1992);
See also Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudenceof Reconstruction, 82 CALI. L. REv. 741
(1994).
S. LLEWELLYN, supra note 1, at 3-5.
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One needs only the briefest exposure to Race and Races, to glimpse
the many ways in which it diverges from this conventional model. To begin with, its focus is not on a discrete body of doctrine, but on the many
bodies of law, and related historical and cultural materials, that bear on the
entrenched social problem of race-based inequality. The light that these
resources shed on this problem is provocatively varied, but also organized
and unified by certain recurrent themes. Many of the selections in the book,
for example, share the baseline assumption that race is integral to, and
deeply constitutive of, one's identity.
Yet if Race and Races seeks to highlight this assumption and its many
implications, it seeks with equal energy to disentangle this assumption
from some of the intellectual frameworks with which it has historically
been connected. Many varieties of contemporary race-consciousness take
their bearings from a framework which treats the experience of African
Americans as paradigmatic of that of other racial minority groups, or which
envisions an encompassing dichotomy between Black and White perspectives. Race and Races begins with the insight that the increasingly diverse
racial configuration of the American population, and the distinct patterns of
oppression experienced by different racial groups, demand a more plural
analytic approach. The book seeks to construct this approach from a set of
discrete but intersecting group-based histories, and a series of distinct
though thematically-related perspectives.
The structure and substance of Race and Races reflects this aspiration.
After a bracing chapter on the challenges of defining racism and race, the
book delves into the historical experience of each of four racial minority
groups (African Americans, American Indians, Latinos/as, and Asian
Americans) in the United States. These rich social, political, and military
histories sound recurrent themes of exclusion and marginalization, but also
highlight distinguishing characteristics: the role of slavery in the African
American experience; the effects of imperialism and conquest in the history of Latinos/as; the centrality of property disputes and issues of intergovernmental relations in the histories of American Indians; the dilemmas
of segregation and integration in the histories of African Americans and
American Indians; and the importance of immigration policies and foreign
relations in the treatment of Asian Americans and Latinos/as. They are also
histories in which law and legal decision making play a salient, but not
dominant, role. Moreover, one quickly observes that "law" is defined more
broadly in these pages than is characteristic in legal textbooks. These
chapters offer the reader not simply the usual appellate opinions, but district court decisions, state and federal statutes, and federal treaties. They
also provide the contemporaneous commentary of some of those responsible for these enactments; we hear the views of Andrew Jackson (pp. 18890), for example, as a preface to the Indian Removal Act (p. 190). These
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histories, finally, are interspersed with provocative editorial questions,
which probe not only the materials and the student's response to the materials, but the student's prior historical exposure. The editors are aware that
they are presenting materials that many students may not have encountered
before; they underscore this point by asking students why they believe that
such materials are frequently excluded from conventional historical surveys.
These lengthy and surprising initial chapters, comprising more than a
third of the book, highlight several conceptual cornerstones of the editors'
approach. The first is an emphasis on social construction in the formation
of racial categories and identities. The challenges implicit in defining race
for various institutional regimes, such as the birth certificate records for the
National Center for Health Statistics (p. 50-55) or the census, demonstrate
the complexity of the categories some students may view as straightforward. Moreover, the historical accounts, with their narratives of subtly
shifting stereotypes and opportunistic characterizations of race, make clear
the operation of these social forces on the lives of people of color. Should
White students have any doubt that this conceptual framework applies to
them as well, a chapter on "The Case of Whiteness" (pp. 429-99) challenges the transparency of race privilege. Readings such as the section on
"How the Irish, Italians, and Jews Became White" (pp. 445-55) raise questions for even the most resistant students about the fixity of racial identities
and meanings. Though a complex, constructivist approach to social and
legal categories may be quite familiar in critical scholarship, this casebook's emphasis represents a departure in training students for a profession
that often deploys racial categories as if their meaning were definitively
established.
The second element visible in these chapters is the editors' understanding of law as one among many social and institutional forces that
shape relations among racial groups. Law is unquestionably a prominent
feature of the group-based histories that open the book. We learn about
legal support for slavery and for Jim Crow (pp. 103-55); about Indian
Removal (pp. 188-91) and Reorganization (pp. 216-19); about the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo and its consequences for land ownership (pp. 26090); and about Chinese Exclusion (pp. 381-95) and Japanese Internment
(pp. 406-11). Yet law is not presented as an exclusive or even a predominant influence. In the opening pages of the book, for example, the editors
describe one aspect of racism as "the effort to structure social life and state
policy along lines of racial difference..." (p. 5). But while law may be
one determinant of racial relations and identities, there are numerous others, from children's fairy tales (pp. 464-78) to imagery from mass media
(pp. 1017-42) and cyberspace (pp. 486-88) to ideologies that ascribe
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characteristics by race (pp. 5-23). These other factors also exert an influence on racial identity and receive careful coverage in Race and Races.
The third distinctive aspect of these chapters is the critical posture
they encourage in the reader. Readers are continually challenged to interrogate the preconceptions with which they approach the material. "Did you
know this?" the editors repeatedly ask, "If not, why not?" Their practice of
placing at the conceptual center those histories which have often been
treated as marginal, and their treatment of whiteness as a racial identity
subject to social construction, offer a useful provocation to White readers
who are accustomed to taking their privileged status and group's history
for granted. The editors' insistence that all racial categories are constituted
by contingent social influence also encourages reflection by those students
of color who may be accustomed to a more static view of racial identity.
Yet at the same time as the editors engender in their readers a critical
stance toward their own preconceptions, they also authorize their readers to
develop and refine their own viewpoints, based on the new information to
which they are being exposed. At the beginning of Chapter 1, for example,
the editors state:
In [this section] we will explore various definitions of racism
in search of a common vocabulary and understanding. As we do so,
reflect on your own starting point. When you meet a new person do
you make a mental note of his/her race? Do you think about his/her
ethnicity? Does your answer to these questions depend upon whom
you are meeting? What do you think racism is? (p. 6).
The breadth and focus of these questions makes it clear to students that
they are not being asked simply to point out the flaws in theoretical analyses or legal decisions, but to clarify their own perspectives on the most
pressing issues raised by the book.
These initial chapters are succeeded by a series of chapters with a
more explicit doctrinal focus. "Developing Notions of Equality" (pp. 50079) are introduced through an exposition of Fourteenth Amendment and
Title VII law. Readers are then exposed to doctrinal developments in areas
such as "Race, Voting, and Political Participation" (pp. 580-645),
"Residential Segregation, Education, and Race" (pp. 646-753), "Racism
and Freedom of Expression" (pp. 754-865), and "Race and Crime" (pp.
1017-90). Yet even these chapters differ substantially from their counterparts in more conventional casebooks. Because the book surveys so many
doctrinal areas germane to race, chapters are not organized around extended or chronological treatments of the elements of central legal claims.
Instead, each chapter explores a limited series of doctrinal developments
that are frequently illustrative of larger conceptual themes. Case law discussions are punctuated by excerpts from theoretical scholarship, often
scholarship that is systematically critical of the doctrinal law being
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explored. These excerpts are not the brief paragraphs used to provide
jumping-off points for discussion, for example, in many Constitutional
Law texts. Rather, they are extended discussions, many numbering eight or
more pages, that introduce new theoretical frameworks for conceptualizing
and critiquing doctrinal developments, and that discuss at length cases that
are not otherwise reproduced in the text.
These doctrinally-grounded chapters are also juxtaposed with others
that have an extralegal focus. "Racism and Popular Culture" (pp. 9591016) offers some illustrative legal contexts in which cultural images may
bear on decision making, but focuses primarily on the exposition of these
images and the identification of the cultural contexts in which they have
arisen. Similarly, "Race, Sexuality, and the Family" (pp. 866-958) explores
an eclectic range of topics, from the meanings ascribed to sexual relations
between masters and slaves, to contemporary practices echoing the era of
forced sterilization of women of color, to the role of dating in generating
racial identity for biracial teens. The issues probed in this chapter may arise
from legal rules legitimizing slavery or eugenic sterilization, or prohibiting
intermarriage, but they are examined as social and psychological rather
than exclusively legal phenomena. A concluding chapter on "Responses to
Racism" (pp. 1091-1154) explores legal and extralegal strategies, to be
deployed both by Whites and by people of color, for ameliorating racism
and inequality.
These chapters build on and complicate the conceptual themes introduced in the early sections of the book. Racial categories are presented not
only as the shifting products of human artifice, but also as ultimately inadequate to contain the complexity of racial experience. The difficulties of
classification are a recurring theme in these chapters, as are the social and
individual meanings of bi-or multiraciality. Shirlee Taylor Haizlip's essay
on being a Black woman whose life "[has] been deeply colored by [her]
absence of deep color" (pp. 948-50), and Lisa Jones' fictional interview
with the "Identity Fairy," who discusses multiracial identity and the
movement to add the category "multiracial" to census forms (pp. 951-58),
are vivid and evocative illustrations of these themes. The law's role as one
among many influences in the construction of race is paralleled by its role
as one among many expedients necessary to remedy racial inequality. The
editors pose questions that encourage doctrinal critique, and help students
flesh out the arguments that might be used to support new doctrinal positions. But they also present "classroom exercises" in which students are
asked to position themselves as school board members, institutional planners, and voters, as well as legal advocates. 9
9. An illustrative exercise appears at the end of the chapter on "Racism and Freedom of
Expression." It presents students with a bill that would make Spanish the official language of Florida.
After asking students "[w]ould such a measure be constitutional?" the editors follow with a series of
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In the final chapter on ameliorative strategies (pp. 1091-1154), students are urged to consider the role of coalition building and various forms
of interpersonal engagement. The critical stance students are urged to take
toward their own preconceptions in the initial chapters of the book is extended to the major legal and cultural institutions of our society. Students
are encouraged to apply a critical lens to judicial decisions, legal initiatives, social practices, and cultural imagery. Moreover, the questions advanced by the editors have affective as well as analytic components. After
presenting Lenore Look's narrative on her mother's decision to vote for the
first time after many years as a naturalized citizen (pp. 580-82), the editors
ask their readers, "Did you have an emotional reaction when Ms. Look's
mother said that she had finally voted? Positive or negative? What meanings are imbedded in the idea of voting?" (p. 583). Readers are encouraged
to draw on their feelings and intuitions as resources for evaluating new perspectives, as well as on their analytic powers.
In short, Race and Races strives to bring into being a law student and
prospective legal professional distinct from the conventional product of
Langdellian pedagogy. This student learns to direct her thinking toward the
resolution of social problems in which law is implicated, as well as toward
bodies of doctrine. She learns to view law not as autonomous, but as a politically and culturally embedded resource, which shapes and is shaped by
other social and institutional practices. She comes to understand the
ongoing social contention that has been central to the production of racial
categories, and the shifting social meanings that threaten constantly to exceed the most complex or variable categories we construct for them. She is
reflective about, and sometimes critical of, her own experience as a guide
to legal and social understanding, but she also feels sufficiently authorized
to begin to formulate new frameworks and understandings as she gains
new knowledge. She does not hierarchize emotion and reason, but deploys
both so as to more fully understand the social and legal practices to which
she is exposed. She uses law, and a variety of other institutional, coalitional, and interpersonal resources, in pragmatic combination, to address
the remedial tasks connected with the problem. Of course, few students are
likely to develop all of these habits of mind through exposure to a single
casebook. But the incitement that Race and Races provides to question familiar methodological assumptions and develop new ones, and the aspiration it demonstrates to cultivate such understandings in a new generation of
law students as well as in scholarly colleagues, are some of the book's
most promising achievements.

less conventional questions that ask students to position themselves in a different way: "If you lived in
Florida, would you vote for it? Learn Spanish as quickly as possible? Gladly, or grudgingly?" (p. 865).
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II
Notwithstanding these valuable innovations, Race and Races sometimes falls short of its aspirations. Some of these shortcomings relate less
to the conceptual innovations discussed above than to the book's substantive treatment of certain issues relating to race. Selection of representative
doctrinal areas is inevitably challenging; when questions of race infuse a
legal system as thoroughly as they do ours, reasonable minds may surely
differ about the importance of various topics. Nonetheless, a few choices
made by the editors seem surprising.
First, the book offers no discrete, sustained treatment of the intersection of race and gender. This seems a noteworthy omission, given the
strong and growing body of legal and related scholarship located at this
intersection, and given the prominence of two of the casebook's editors in
this very area."0 There is no doubt that gender is consistently at issue in the
chapter on sexuality and family (pp. 866-958); and it is also treated more
episodically in sections on employment discrimination (pp. 570-79), crime
(pp. 1017-90), freedom of expression (pp. 754-865), and voting (pp. 580645). But to explore gender predominantly under the rubrics of sexuality
and family risks confining it to two of its most limiting conceptualizations.
More affirmatively, to explore intersections between gender and race in a
more systematic way might provide another concrete way of demonstrating
the complexity of racial categories, or of revealing connections or contrasts
among different examples of racism. For example, the editors could have
afforded this set of a issues a larger chapter, including or in addition to the
explorations of sexuality and family.
A second choice that raised questions was the omission of any sustained analysis of race and poverty, or of recent efforts to reform the welfare system. An emphasis on poverty was, again, not altogether absent. The
relationship between race and poverty is implicated in the materials on
residential segregation, on race and family, and on race and crime. But the
complex entanglements between these two characteristics, for most of the
groups the book surveys, would seem to merit separate treatment. Moreover, recent legislative efforts at welfare reform, culminating in the passage
of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996,11 are so heavily marked by ideologies of race, and have such potential to immiserate women of color and their children, that they seem to demand more extended treatment.

10. See, e.g., SExPHANIE M. WILDmAN, Er AL.. PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE
PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990).
11.
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 8, 21, 25 and 42 U.S.C.).
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The editors also seem ambivalent about their own use of categorization, when they seek either to cluster cases within subject areas or to conceptualize the accounts of inequality presented in some of the longer
excerpts. The chapter on "Race, Sexuality and the Family" (pp. 866-958),
for example, brings together a wide array of factually distinct issues, but
organizes them only very broadly under the headings of "Sexuality,"
"Marriage," and "Children and Families." The variety of cases within each
category, and the issues that recur among categories (each, for example,
includes issues of coercion or consent, or fluidity or fixity in identity) made
me wonder whether a more decisive, conceptual form of organization
would have been more helpful to the reader. The chapter on developing
notions of equality makes a similar, substantively-based distinction between the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII, leaving the excerpted articles to do the more strenuous work of framing the specific notions of
equality themselves. Here, too, a heavier conceptual hand by the editors
might have clarified things for the reader: a chapter organized by different
notions of equality, which scholars have observed 12 cut across different
constitutional and statutory categories, might have helped the reader to see
the emergence of particular conceptions and to make comparisons among
them. There are plausible reasons for the editors' reticence in these respects: a casebook that aims to foster critical thinking in its readers may
want them to expend energy to grasp its organization. More importantly, a
book that aims to highlight the inevitable limitations of categories might
wish to avoid imposing too many of its own. But it is possible to overstate
these rationales, and there are strong arguments on the other side. The
broad range and ambition of this casebook (and the fact that it might successfully be used as an introduction to this area) make an effort toward
greater clarity in presentation important. Moreover, students learn to challenge and resist categories by first understanding how they operate. A
greater willingness by the editors to conceptualize groups of cases and
theoretical insights to which they contribute would help on both of these
counts.
Other weaknesses in the book bear more directly on its mission of
producing a new kind of legal actor. The book might have been strengthened, for example, by a more sustained treatment of the affirmative meanings of race. 3 The affirmative valuation of minority racial experience, and
12. See, e.g., Tracey E. Higgins & Laura A. Rosenbury, Agency, Equalityand Antidiscrimination
Law, 85 CORNELL L. Ryv. 1194 (2000); D. Marvin Jones, No Time For Trumpets: Title VII, Equality
and the Fin de Siecle, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2311 (1994) (describing continuities in constitutional and
statutory doctrines relating to race discriminaton).
13. See, e.g., PATRICIA HIL COLLINS, BLACK FEMInIST THOUGHT 99-103, 107-10 (1991)
(describing affirmative racial imagery that Black women have generated to contrast dominant images);
SHIRLEE TAYLOR HAIZLIPP, THE SWEETER THE JUICE: A FAMILY MEMout IN BLACK AND WHITE
(1994) (offering affirmative conceptions of African American racial identity that have emerged within
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of racial difference, has met with a mixed reception in the law. The oncepotent state interest in diversity 4 is now embattled, 5 and other rationales
for affirmative action have suffered even harsher fates. 6 But the next generation of lawyers, who are being trained to address race-based inequality
with a range of legal and extralegal resources, should be equipped to convey a full understanding of the affirmative meanings of minority racial experience. These meanings surface in some sections of the book: they are
particularly salient among biracial writers of Black and White parentage
like Shirlee Taylor Haizlip (pp. 948-50) and Lisa Jones (pp. 951-58), who
reflect pride in and deliberate identification with their blackness. Such
meanings are also a factor in the desegregation cases discussed by Drew
Days (pp. 710-22), in which Black plaintiffs seek state support for racially
identifiable schools rather than further efforts at racial integration. But
there are other sections that would have been enriched by a discussion of
such affirmative meanings.
The history of residential segregation in this country is importantly
one of stigmatization and exclusion, but there are also instances of more
self-consciously affirmative or ambivalent residential groupings. What affirmative benefits are gained through the creation or preservation of Chinatowns in major urban areas? What positive experiences and
identifications arise from neighborhoods strongly populated by members of
a flourishing Black middle class? What dilemmas arise for successful people of color as they contemplate departing central city areas for the suburbs? More emphasis on the affirmative meanings assigned to race would
highlight complexities or tensions within the self-conceptions of minority
populations, and would underscore the agency of people of color in resisting dominant racial ideologies.
Another weakness is the book's failure fully to disrupt a unitary paradigm for understanding racism and race. One of the editors' prime examples of the limits of categorical thinking is the tendency to conceptualize
race in "black and white": to use the species of racism directed against
African Americans as a paradigm for understanding other kinds of racial
discrimination. The need to go "beyond black and white" has an aspirational aspect as well: today's race lawyers, who will confront a far more
the author's own experience). There are also qualitative, empirical accounts that seek to give content to
the sometimes strategic legal or policy claim that racial diversity makes an affirmative institutional
contribution. See RicHARD J. Liciir, MAKING THE MOST OF COLLEGE: STUDENTS SPEAK THImR
Mnms 129-89 (2001).
14. See Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (diversity accepted as important state
interest); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J.) (diversity accepted as
compelling state interest).
15. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 948 (5th Cir. 1996) (diversity rejected as compelling
state interest); Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 843-50 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (same).
16. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (role model theory rejected as
compelling state interest).
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plural social world, should understand how to conceptualize and address
the different dimensions of racial inequality in a more comprehensive way.
Yet the editors are only partially successful in their efforts to displace,
or pluralize, this paradigm. The excerpts from scholarship that address this
theme, notably the important work done by editor Juan Perea (pp. 549,
858-59, 1017-18), focus more on the critique than on the reconceptualization. And the more practical proposals, such as Mari Matsuda's injunction
to "Ask the other question," that link racism with other systems of oppression (p. 1113), offer pragmatic incitements to further thought, rather than
the outline of a more complex conceptual structure. Moreover, the readings
in several of the doctrinal sections tend to focus primarily on the experience of African Americans, either underemphasizing the distinct experiences of other groups, or treating the experience of Blacks as paradigmatic.
This is not, to be sure, a consistent problem. Some chapters, such as the
discussion of voting rights, are surprisingly plural given the central role
played by African Americans in extending the right to vote. Others, such as
the chapter on crime, intersperse discussions of stereotypes regarding
Blacks (and Latinos/as) as perpetrators with discussions of stereotypes regarding Asians as victims. But in some chapters, such as the chapter on
residential segregation and education, the focus on African American patterns predominates; the reader finishes the chapter with unanswered questions about contrasts between Blacks and other racial minority groups. In
the discussion of cross-racial adoption, White parents' adoption of Black
children is, again, the primary focus. This focus is in some respects justified: this particular pairing has been the subject of greatest controversy,
because of the numbers of African American children in need of permanent
homes, and because of the opposition of the National Association of Black
Social Workers to White adoption of Black children (p. 946). Yet other
patterns, which have become increasingly prevalent, such as the adoption
by White parents of female infants from China, would seem to raise distinct issues. While these are addressed in a few provocative editorial questions (p. 948), a more extensive, textual treatment might help the reader to
envision a more plural conceptual framework.
A more fully-theorized, multiracial framework would not only juxtapose the assumptions and ideologies that affect different minority groups, it
might also explore salient tensions within these groups themselves. It is
important not to overemphasize intra-group (or inter-minority-group) divisions, particularly when some of these arise from the constraints imposed
by racial hierarchy and inequality. 7 But while the same is true, for example, within feminism, analyses of divergences among feminists (or among
17. See Mary Louise Fellows & Sherene Razack, The Race to Innocence: Confronting
HierarchicalRelations Among Women, I J. GENDER RACE & JusT. 335 (1998) (discussing role of
intersecting inequalities and hierarchies in creating conflicts among groups of women).
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women) have fruitfully illuminated tensions within the goals and selfconceptions of the group. 8 Several features of the current organization of
the book make such analyses difficult. The decision to explore history
group-by-group, rather than on a multi-group, chronological basis, complicates the drawing of contrasts regarding the White majority's treatment of
different minority groups. It also complicates the analysis of relations
among groups (or within groups) by focusing instead on each group's relationship to dominant Whites. Furthermore, the editors explore relatively
few instances of either tension or coalition among racial minority groups,
or subgroups thereof. They describe some disagreement among Latinos/as,
or among Asian Americans, for example, about English-only statutes (84456, 859-61), and they return on several occasions to the divisions among
biracial and multiracial individuals about the movement for new census
categories (pp. 64-77, 951-58). But there are other places, such as in the
areas of racial districting and interracial adoption, where further exploration of the dialogue among and within minority groups would have been
illuminating.
Finally, the editors' articulation of a new role for lawyers committed
to racial justice, while a noteworthy departure, does not extend as far as it
might. The clear implication of the book is that a lawyer confronting entrenched inequality, and the law's continuing implication in that inequality,
must have a range of remedial resources at her disposal. She must continue
the ongoing efforts to use doctrine and legislation to her advantage, but she
must also understand the importance of addressing nonlegal barriers to
equality with non-legal means. And she must be able to shift pragmatically
to the latter form of solution when legal efforts are thwarted. To fuel this
pragmatic impulse the editors explore a range of remedial strategies, particularly in the final chapter. They offer Martin Luther King's Letterfrom a
Birmingham Jail (pp. 1097-1104), discuss strategies of coalition building
(pp. 1104-17), and explain the practice of "race treason" by Whites (pp.
1118-21). They also offer excerpts on racial healing, in the form of apology
(pp. 1123-30) and collaborative participation in various forms of cultural
exploration (pp. 1130-35). It is new and enlivening to see these strategies
as resources that every beginning lawyer should have at her disposal. Yet
the approaches surveyed by the editors seemed in some respects to reflect a
dichotomous strategy of the legal and the interpersonal. Without denying
the crucial character of legal or interpersonal strategies for political change,
I wondered if they might have focused more on fleshing out a middle
18. See, e.g., SEYLA BENHABIB Fr AL., FEMINIST CONTENTIONS (1995); CONFLICTS IN FEMiNISM
(Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller, eds.) (1990). See also JOAN WILLMIS, UNBENDING
GENDER: WHY FAILY AND WORK CoNrFLIc'r AND WHAT TO Do ABoUT IT (2000) (discussing
conflicts among different schools of feminist thinkers and advocates in the context of work or family
conflict).
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ground. King's words, for example, allude to a range of nonviolent action
strategies that have been and might be used in the struggle for racial justice. It might have been helpful to elicit discussion of various examples.
Discussion of institutional approaches, such as those that have succeeded
within governmental institutions, businesses, or civic organizations, would
also have been helpful. Lawyers often counsel such institutions, and familiarity with successful strategies might be an integral part of that role.
Finally, strategies of economic or cultural self-sufficiency for racial minorities19 might usefully be explored, to complete the range of options
available to the new generation of legal professionals.
III
Happily, many of these drawbacks can be remedied by supplementation; the editors of a casebook have opportunities for revision that authors
of other scholarly works may not enjoy. They do not, in any case, detract
substantially from the very real accomplishments of Race and Races. To
use the opportunities provided by a casebook to help form a different kind
of legal professional is no small achievement, particularly given the relative stasis of legal pedagogy (as opposed to legal scholarship) over the last
decades. It is, moreover, an achievement that seems particularly imperative
in light of recent movements in the law relating to race. With the Court's
turn to color blindness,2" and increasingly restrictive reading of Congress'
power over civil rights,2" and with the prospect of new Republicanappointed justices on the horizon, we may be approaching the time prophesied by Derrick Bell in his incitement to "Racial Realism":22 a time when it
becomes clear that neither legislation nor legal doctrine will provide the
answer to racial inequality. This impasse poses a crucial challenge to
equality lawyers who have turned consistently to the legal system, and to
critical race theorists who have questioned this strategy, but now find an
even less reliable audience among lawyers and judges for their reconstructive theorizing. By training a generation of lawyers who can deploy
19. Regina Austin has done thoughtful and challenging work on this question. See, e.g., Regina
Austin, "Ali Honest Living ": Street Vendors, MunicipalRegulation, and the Black Public Sphere, 103
YALE L.J. 2119 (1994); Regina Austin, "Not Justfor the Fun of It!": Government Restraintson Black
Leisure, Social Inequality, and the PrivatizationofPublic Space, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 667 (1998).
20. See cases cited supranote 5.
21. The Court has recently begun to restrict this power through several confluent lines of
doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (limitations on Congress's
Commerce Clause power); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (limitations on
Congress's enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (same); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (same); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (refusals to abrogate state sovereign
immunity in the context of statutory civil rights actions); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44 (1996) (same).
22. See Bell, supra note 7.
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institutional, coalitional, and interpersonal strategies as they undertake reconceptualizations that permit renewal in the legal system, educators such
as the authors of Race and Races may provide the best chance for surviving, and transforming, this impasse.
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Book Review
Teaching the Law of Race
RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA.

Edited By Juan F. Perea,t Richard Delgado,tt Angela P. Harris,ttt and
Stephanie M. Wildman.tttt
St. Paul: West Group, 2000. Pp. xlix, 1171. $60.00 cloth.
Reviewed by Anthony V Alfieri

INTRODUCTION

For too long, scholars have debated the place of race in the legal academy. Clothed in private silence and public quarrel,' the debate rises again
in the wake of the duly celebrated publication of Race and Races: Cases
and Resourcesfor a Diverse America. Situated at the intersection of civil
rights, jurisprudential, and interdisciplinary movements, Race and Races
provides a sweeping account of race in American law and society.' Interest
in this account will be keen for those seeking to understand the theory and
Copyright © 2001 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a California
nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their publications.
t
Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Hazouri & Roth Professor of Law, University of Florida.
ft
Jean Lindsley Professor of Law, Univeristy of Colorado.
tit
Professor of Law, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall).
Professor of Law, Santa Clara Law School.
fttt
Professor of Law and Director, Center for Ethics and Public Service, University of Miami
I
School of Law. I am grateful to David Abraham, Kathy Abrams, Margalynne Armstrong, Adrian
Barker, Wes Daniels, Richard Delgado, John Ely, Michael Fischl, Clark Freshman, Ellen Grant, Patrick
Gudridge, Angela Harris, Amelia Hope, Lisa Iglesias, Sharon Keller, Juan Perea, Susan Stefan, Jean
Stefancic, Frank Valdes, Stephanie Wildman, Robert Williams, and Eric Yamamoto for their comments
and support. I also wish to thank Porpoise Evans, Christina Farley, Shana Stephens, and the University
of Miami School of Law library staff for their research assistance, and Michael Gallo and the
California Lmv Review for their commitment, patience, and skill. This Essay is dedicated to critical
race friends.
I. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. RPv. 561 (1984); Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques ofLegal Academia,
102 HARv. L. REv. 1745 (1989).
2. For complementary accounts, see CRIICAL RACE FErIINisM: A READER (Adrien Katherine
Wing ed., 1997); CROSSROADS, DmcECONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes,
Jr. et al. eds., forthcoming Feb. 2002); CRmCAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTrING EDGE (Richard
Delgado & Jean Stenfancie eds., 2d ed. 1999); C~rrICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRniNGS THAT
FORMED THE MovarsAIr (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); RACIAL CLASSIFICATION AND
HISTORY (E. Nathaniel Gates ed., 1997); and READINGS IN RACE AND LAW: A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
RACE THEORY (Alex M. Johnson, Jr. ed., 1998). See also ANGELO N. ANCHETA, RACE, RIGHTS, AND
THE ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERIFNCE (1998).
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practice of race in law, and equally important, in lawyering and ethics.3
Often stymied, advocacy-grounded efforts to grasp the meaning and take
the measure of race in action demand the mapping of law and the lawyering process in race cases along the boundaries of racial identity, racialized
narrative, and interracial community.4 Careful mapping enables lawyers
and judges to embrace race when relevant and, conversely, to reject it when
inapposite. Elsewhere I have argued that these boundaries starkly demarcate the practice of criminal law, particularly the prosecution and defense
of racial violence.5 Beyond the criminal law, however, the scope and depth
of racial boundaries lie largely unmarked.6
Accordingly, the first purpose of this Book Review is to mark the
boundary lines of contemporary sociolegal research on race synthesized by
the distinguished editors of Race and Races and tested, indeed sometimes
traversed, by the accompanying book reviews in this collection. In addition
to framing the bright lines of discussion for this rich collection, the second
purpose of this Review is to critique the effort by the editors to set down
some rough markers surveying the meaning of racial identity, the content
of racialized narrative, and the form of race-neutral and race-conscious representation. Race and Races establishes the groundwork for its analysis by
tracing the genealogy and multiplicity of race and racism, splicing race to
law, citizenship, culture, and society, and finally, adjoining race to legal
and social reform. To integrate these themes, the editors formulate certain
guiding principles of criticism. Applied to the sociolegal text of race, these
3. See Robin D. Barnes, Interracial Violence and Racialized Narratives: Discoveringthe Road
Less Traveled, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 788 (1996); Richard Delgado, Making Pets: Social Workers,
"Problem Groups," and the Role of the SPCA-Getting a Little More Precise About Racialized
Narratives, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1571 (1999); Elaine R. Jones & Jaribu Hill; Contemporary Civil Rights
Struggle: The Role of Black Attorneys, 16 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 185 (1999); Abbe Smith, Burdening the
Least of Us: "'Race-Conscious"Ethics in Criminal Defense, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1585 (1999); David B.
Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, and Professional Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REv.
1502 (1998); David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment: Should a Black Laviyer
Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1030 (1995).
4. Racialized narrative refers to the racial rhetoric (the race talk) found in the juridical
storytelling of lawyers and judges. Interracial community refers to the convergence and clash of
interests among communities of color. For a deft illustration of the mapping of narrative and
community in the context of race, see David B. Wilkins, On Being Good and Black, 112 HARv. L. REV.
1924 (1999) (reviewing PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA
(1999)).
5. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1995);
Anthony V. Alfieri, (Er)Race-ing an Ethic of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 935 (1999); Anthony V.
Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racialized Defenses, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1063 (1997);
Anthony V. Alfieri, ProsecutingRace, 48 DUKE L.J. 1157 (1999); Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting
Violence/Reconstructing Community, 52 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2000); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials,
76 TEX. L. REV. 1293 (1998); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race-ing Legal Ethics, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 800
(1996).
6. See Naomi R. Cahn, RepresentingRace Outside of Explicitly Racialized Contexts, 95 MICH.
L. REv. 965 (1997); Margaret M. Russell, Beyond "Sellouts" and "Race Cards": Black Attorneys and
the Straitjacketof Legal Practice,95 MICH. L. REV. 766 (1997).
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rules of reading urge us to "make the implicit explicit" and to "look for the
hidden norm" (p. 3). Moreover, they direct us to "avoid we/they thinking"
and "remember context" (p. 3). Further, they steer us toward "justice" by
contemplating "benefits and harm" (p. 3). Last, they exhort us to "trust
intuition" (p. 3). Against this backdrop of textual construction and criticism, the Review follows the discrete divisions of the casebook: Part I examines the genealogy of race and racism, Part II analyzes the multiplicity
of race and racism, Part III considers race, law, and citizenship, Part IV
explores race, culture, and society, and Part V assesses race and reform in
legal theory and practice.
I
THE GENEALOGY

OF RACE AND RACISM

Race and Races opens by evaluating the relationship between the
practices of racism and the concept of race. Racism, according to the editors, carries material and ideological import for both the collective and the
individual. For the collective, material racism infects the structure of social
life and state policy. For the individual, racism inflicts particularized harm.
Contingent on racial difference, these material practices find justification in
"a pool of beliefs, symbols, metaphors and images" that define a natural
order (p. 6).
From the outset, the editors challenge the natural order of race. Deploying the work of a wide variety of scholars, they assert that in American
history "racial hierarchy rather than racial equality has been the fundamental organizing principle" (p. 14). For example, Benjamin Ringer and
Elinor Lawless argue (pp. 6-11) that the genealogy of race and racism
originates in "the colonial expansion of the White European from the fifteenth century onward" (p. 6). Initiated by early Spanish conquistadors and
English settlers, this expansion created a dual colonial society, racially
segmented between dominant Whites and subordinate non-Whites. Tessie
Liu (pp. 11-12) shows how that duality, linked to European dynastic customs and colonial racial privileges, produced "bifurcated visions of
womanhood" (p. 11) that cast White women as guardians of civilization
and non-White women as both desexualized laborers and easily available
sexual objects. Such visions of privilege and their constituent categories of
racial and gender subordination permeated the structures of the colonial
world so thoroughly as to make them appear natural, even banal. It is precisely the banality and seeming naturalness of what Michael Omi and
Howard Winant call "racial dictatorship" (pp. 12-13) that allowed it to
shape historical notions of identity, color, and nationalism through coercion and consent (pp. 6-14).'
7. Omi and Winant remark that "hegemonic forms of racial rule-those based on consenteventually came to supplant those based on coercion" (p. 13).
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To amplify the ideas of physical force and ideological enforcement,
the editors weave together multiple theories of oppression, such as Iris
Young's politics of difference (pp. 14-15), and Robert Blauner's catalogue
of colonized minorities (pp. 16-20), offering a broad "account for the many
different ways in which [racialized] groups can be oppressed" (pp. 15-16).
The account also draws on Joel Kovel's psychohistory of White racism
(pp. 23-25), and Robert Williams's research on European racism and colonialism (pp. 26-28). It cites both conscious and unconscious forms of racist
microaggression, noting Robert Chang and Keith Aoki's work on nativism
(pp. 28-31), Linda Hamilton Krieger's study of cognitive bias (pp. 33-36),
and Charles Lawrence's writing on the unconscious (pp. 3741). It also
usefully recommends classroom exercises and scenarios elucidating the
individual, cultural, and institutional dimensions of racism. The classroom
exercises strive to discern the presence or absence of racism on college
campuses and city streets, as well as in high schools and in the media (pp.
20-23). Discernment, the editors remark, entails multiple theories and definitions of racism marked by the relationships of perpetrator and victim,
individual and institution, culture and society, ideology and practice, and
conscious and unconscious intent. Although often overt, the social and
cultural relationships of racism sometimes vanish under the neutral veil of
legal pedagogy (pp. 1145-54) and practice.8
In the practice of law and lawyering, racial microaggressions routinely
take the form of stereotyping at trial in criminal and civil actions.' Turning
to practice, the editors describe the microaggressions of racial stereotypes
in courtroom advocacy and trial testimony. Their account calls attention to
the "[a]mple evidence" of stereotyping suffusing the legal process. Surprisingly, the account fails to call for the establishment of an ethical duty to
refrain from or to avoid "triggering" racial advocacy, especially in criminal
cases. Instead, in an apparent concession to race-saturated lawyering, the
editors suggest that while lawyers' "playing of the race card" may be repugnant, the "special duty of 'zealous advocacy"' to criminal clients may
sometimes call for a defense lawyer to exploit party, juror, or public prejudice. Rather than resolve this tension, the editors use it to provoke reflection about the permissible ambit of lawyer professional responsibility in
race cases (pp. 36-37), leaving others to make the case for an ethical duty
to refrain from race stereotyping in the courtroom. °
Specifically, the editors show how private and public stereotyping,
and state-sanctioned exclusion and inclusion, take shape through a series of
material and discursive practices fashioning the definition of race. These
8. See Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression,98 YALE L.J. 1559 (1989).
9. See Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, supranote 5: Alfieri, Race Trials,supra note 5.
10. See Alfieri, (Er)Race-ing an Ethic of Justice, supra note 5; Alfieri, Race-ing Legal Ethics,
supra note 5.
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practices can be glimpsed in Christopher Ford's work on state administrative differentiation in the classification of people by race (pp. 50-55), and
in Joe Feagin and Clairece Booher Feagin's writing on the development of
the concept of race in biology and social science (pp. 56-58). This work is
buttressed by Tessie Liu's analysis of race and gender as social categories
of knowledge and proof (pp. 58-59). In fact, Yen Le Espiritu contends that
the legal sedimentation of nineteenth-century racial categories produces a
kind of "pan-ethnicity" in the treatment of different minority ethnic groups
under the racial rubric of a single, dominant culture (p. 60). The tendency
toward pan-ethnic groupings in law and legal practices strains against
color-blind traditions in constitutional, statutory, and regulatory jurisprudence. This tension emerges in Neil Gotanda's examination of the false
color-blind quality of constitutional jurisprudence (pp. 61-63), Luis Angel
Toro's review of obscurantist ethnic classifications (pp. 64-69), and Tanya
Kateri Hernndez's exploration of "pseudoscientific" multiracial classifications (pp. 69-77). The editors marshal this literature to declare that "race
is fluid, rather than fixed" and to countenance "the increasing number of
openly multiracial people" (p. 77). The fluidity of multiracial identity categories adds complexity to the advocacy and adjudication of civil rights
claims, such as those at issue in the racial classification of American
Indians in Arthur Perkins v. Lake County Department of Utilities (pp. 7790).1 Civil rights advocates struggle to contain this fluidity both as a matter of strategy 2 and as a matter of professionalism. 3 Unfortunately, the
editors make no recommendations on how to cabin and sort out this growing complexity, moving instead to a discussion of multiplicity.
II
THE MULTIPLICITY OF RACE AND RACISM

With the theoretical foundation in place, the editors next trace the
particular histories and struggles of four groups: African Americans,
American Indians, Latinos/as, and Asian Americans. The juxtaposition of
those histories shows both the multiplicity and the unity of racism in the
United States. Multiplicity gains from both external and internal comparison of these diverse groups. Externally, their ranks span two centuries of
colonial and imperial expansion. Internally, their color, geography, and
political economy vary across region and locale. Yet, despite such differences, they experience unity in the changing caste of racial subordination.
11.
860 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (discussing the extent to which provable genetic and
heriditary classification controls membership in a protected class under Title VII).
12. See Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators,
104 YALE L.J. 763 (1995); Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political
LaiiyeringPracticein Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MIcH. L. REv. 821 (1997).
13. See Russell, supra note 6.

HeinOnline -- 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1609 2001

1610

CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW

A.

[Vol. 89:1605

African Americans

For the editors, parsing the multiple strands of race and racism in
American history highlights "the constant, rational struggle of African
Americans against the oppression imposed upon them" (p. 91). That struggle frames the editors' discussion of African American history beginning
with the colonial assumptions made by the Framers, notably Benjamin
Franklin and Thomas Jefferson. Their eighteenth-century view of race, difference, and the natural inferiority of African Americans animated the
early debate over slavery and secured its constitutional accommodation, in
spite of countervailing natural-law ideology and abolitionist judgment, best
exemplified by Frederick Douglass's essay The Meaning of July Fourthfor
the Negro (pp. 106-07).
To resolve this constitutional contradiction and to avoid the reductionism of property-based interest analysis, the editors focus on the "lived
experiences and histories" of race in American society (p. 107). They uncover those histories in the legal and social structures of slavery, citing the
text of the Virginia slave laws (pp. 108-11) and the violence of slave conditions disclosed in the despairing 1861 interview of Lavinia Bell (pp. 11214). Strict judicial enforcement sustained this regime of legal violence
erected upon the fear of slave insurrection and resistance. Examples include the perverse North Carolina and Louisiana state court opinions of
State v. John Mann (pp. 114-16) 14 and Kennedy v. Mason (pp. 116-18)."5
Both narrowly interpreted property and tort laws to endorse a slaveholder's
property rights in slaves "damaged" by third parties, but denied the slaves'
own rights to seek redress for abusive treatment. This jurisprudence of
state-sanctioned cruelty acquired sufficient force of logic to overcome the
sentiment of anti-slavery southern judges. Herbert Aptheker documents the
way this jurisprudence worked to suppress slave rebellion. Suppression
occurred not only through physical force, but also through the denial of
citizenship in Dred Scott v. Sandford (pp. 123-25), 6 a case later denounced
in Frederick Douglass's speech to the American Anti-Slavery Society (pp.
126-29).
Although they advert to the antislavery moral discourse of the
Abolitionist movement and the opprobrium towards slavery expressed
during the Civil War, the editors note the ambivalence and expedience of
the Reconstruction Era's attitudes toward African American equality, citing the core weakness in the equality principle soon manifested in an upsurge of federalism doctrine protecting state interests and in Jim Crow
14.
13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829) (discussing whether a cruel and unreasonable battery on a slave
by the hirer is indictable).
15.
10 La. Ann. 519 (1855) (holding slave overseer liable to the owner for slave mistreatment
and killing).
16. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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segregation laws. Given legal encouragement from the Supreme Court's
holding in Plessy v. Ferguson(pp. 142-47),17 the Jim Crow Era of separatebut-equal laws not only disenfranchised Blacks through literacy qualifications, poll taxes, and the White primary, but also degraded their education
through deficient public schools and textbooks. Reinforced by the lynching
and mob violence recounted in Barbara Holden-Smith's historical digest
(pp. 149-51), this degradation and isolation extended even into the
American military both here and abroad in the twentieth century. In the
1918 French Directive (p. 153-54), for example, the U.S. Army attempted
to discourage fraternization between French and American Black troops
because it might incense White Americans.
Shifting to the modem era, the editors survey post-WWII segregation,
the rise of the NAACP, and the civil rights movement. Here they embrace
the early litigation campaigns crafted by Charles Hamilton Houston and
Thurgood Marshall, and the collective action and organized protest of the
Montgomery bus boycott and the student sit-in movement in Greensboro,
North Carolina (pp. 156-64). Skeptical of formal equality as a bulwark
against racial violence, however, the editors limit their celebration of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, a dissonance
that haunts advocates and antiracist judges alike (pp. 129-72). To be clear,
that discordancy in no way inhibits the advocacy or enforcement of civil
rights remedies. Instead, it shrouds the pursuit of equality in the despair of
unrealized hopes."
B. American Indians
The editors continue their exploration of American racism by turning
to the history of American Indians, emphasizing the diversity and particularity of the Indian nations. Their starting point is the doctrine of conquest
and dominion depicted in Johnson v. McIntosh (pp. 175-78).19 Borrowing
from the work of Robert Williams on the cultural bias of federal Indian
law, the editors scrutinize the views of the Framers expressed in the 1783
correspondence of George Washington to James Duane and in
Washington's Third Annual Presidential Address to Congress, subsequently reiterated in the 1803 letters of President Jefferson to William
Henry Harrison and in Jefferson's Confidential Message Recommending a
Western Exploring Expedition. Surprisingly restrained in its racial tenor,
the Washington-Duane correspondence refers to the Indian nations as
17.
163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding constitutionality of 1890 Louisiana statute providing for
separate railway carriages for the "white and colored races").
18. See DERRICK A. BELL,FACES AT THE BoTroM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM

(1992); A. LEON

HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF
(1996); LIN WASHINGTON, BLACK JUDGES ON JUSTICE (1994).

THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS

19. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (discussing federal court recognition of Indian tribal land
claims).
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"Savages" and "Wild Beasts of the Forest," while Washington's 1791
Presidential Address adverts to the "deluded tribes" of the Indian nations as
"an unenlightened race of men" (pp. 179-82). The Jefferson-Harrison letter
on Indian affairs urges the cultivation of the "affectionate attachment" of
the Indian nations through mercantile trade and debt accumulation; Jefferson's ConfidentialMessage similarly lauds the "wisdom" of economic exchange (pp. 183-84). Reflected in the substance of early federal Indian
policy, those views approved White expansion and Indian displacement,
through force and seizure if necessary (pp. 173-85).2"
The editors track these foundational views in the development of federal Indian policy under the Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts of 1790 to
1834 and the Indian Removal Act of 1830 (pp. 186-88, 190). Echoed in
President Andrew Jackson's First Annual Message to Congress in 1829
(pp. 188-90), such views reached fruition in the White state law and land
seizure prerogatives of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (194-202),2' the asserted state sovereignty and constitutional resistance of Worcester v.
Georgia (202-07),21 and the frustrated federal criminal jurisdiction over
Indian reservations in Ex Parte Crow Dog (pp. 208-12).23 However deeply
contested, the judicially condoned state prerogatives of seizure and removal complemented the paternalistic expansion of federal court criminal
jurisdiction over Indian reservations in United States v. Kagama (pp. 21315)24 and the congressional splintering of tribalism under the plenary power
of the General Allotment Act of 1887 in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock (p. 216)."5
While the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, recounted by Vine Deloria,
Clifford Lytle, and Felix Cohen (pp. 217-19), ended the policy of privatizing tribal land through allotment and renewed the notion of tribal sovereignty and the doctrine of reserved rights, the editors point to the identity
politics of the "termination period" as the reawakening of Indian consciousness-raising, resistance, and self-determination manifested in the
1961 Declaration of Indian Purpose (pp. 221-23) and the disputed employment preference of Morton v. Mancari (pp. 208-28).26 This reawakening, they add, evolved in tension with the diminished-rights claims of Lac
20. Consider also Jefferson's 1785 letter to the Marquis de Chastellux (p. 185) (comparing Indian
and Black claims to White equality).
21.
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I (1831) (reviewing Georgia statutory seizure of Cherokee land).
22. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (invalidating Georgia state law prosecution of Vermont citizen
for residing on Cherokee land).
23.
109 U.S. 556 (1883) (voiding Dakota criminal indictment, conviction, and sentencing of
member of Brule Sioux Indian nation).
24.
118 U.S. 375 (1886) (permitting federal criminal court jurisdiction over Hoopa Valley Indian
reservation murder).
25.
187 U.S. 553 (1903) (dismissing Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Indian challenge to
congressional enactment of Allotment-era statutes as non-justiciable political question).
26. 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (rejecting non-Indian employee race discrimination and due process
challenge to the Bureau of Indian Affairs' employment preference program).
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du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Stop Treaty
Abuse-Wisconsin, Inc.2 7 and the eroded commitment to tribalism and
equality (pp. 228-30). It is unclear whether a similar normative deterioration Will impede the international human rights strategies of indigenous
peoples recalled by James Anaya and the legal rights struggle of native
Hawaiians (pp. 236-46).
C. Latinos/as
The historical experience of Latinos/as is marked by their survival of
a double conquest: first by Spain, and then by the United States through its
annexation of Texas and the 1846-48 War with Mexico. Stripping away the
rhetoric of Manifest Destiny, the editors reveal the familiar currents of
White supremacy and racial dominion driving the conquest of Mexico and
the invasion of Puerto Rico. Rhetorically, the currents of imperial superiority inform the history of the amendment and ratification of the 1848
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (pp. 260-66). That history chronicles the
diminution of Mexican American citizenship claims, coupled with the dilution of their legal status and the restriction of their land ownership rights.
For illustration, the editors cite the citizenship borders of the California
Constitution of 1849 (pp. 266-67) erected to permit only White citizens to
vote. Bolstered in People v. De La Guerra (pp. 267-270),21 the borders
confirm that the treaty-ratified grant of citizenship did not guarantee the
possession of all political rights such as the exercise of the electoral
franchise in California. The editors demonstrate how United States courts
expanded these borders of exclusion by construing land grant claims to
dispossess Mexican property owners under the ideology of Manifest
Destiny in the Northern New Mexico land grant litigation (pp. 272-75), and
under the weight of cases such as John CharlesFremont v. United States
(pp. 275-78),29 De Arguello v. United States (pp. 278-80)," Botiller v.
Dominguez (pp. 282-83),31 and UnitedStates v. Sandoval (pp. 284-87).32
Having shown the futility of litigation and the ubiquity of violence,
the editors next count the varied modes of Mexican American resistance to
American conquest in the Southwest. Reciting the history of the Cortina
Wars and the New Mexico Land Grant Wars, as well as border folklore
27. 759 F. Supp. 1339 (W.D. Wis. 1991) (issuing preliminary injunction prohibiting private
individuals from interfering with the Chippewas' off-reservation spearing of walleye).
28. 40 Cal. 311 (1870).
29. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 542 (1854) (confirming validity of Mexican American land conveyance).
30. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 539 (1855) (affirming validity of Mexican land grant claim to California
ranch).
31.
130 U.S. 238 (1889) (approving federal statutorily created California Land Claims
Commission jurisdiction over private land claims of Mexican citizen).
32. 167 U.S. 278 (1897) (confirming land grants to individual settlers, rather than common lands,
in New Mexico territory).
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(pp. 293-99), they stress that Mexican American resistance continues in
contemporary battles over linguistic primacy, educational equality, and
agricultural labor. Fought out against the current backdrop of state bilingual education, the main linguistic battle concerns the merits of regional
bilingualism in Spanish and English (pp. 299-304). The educational battle
goes to the struggle against segregation in schools and public facilities (pp.
304-09). An even more pitched battle relates to the employment struggle of
Mexican immigrant agricultural labor in the fields of the Southwest, especially California. Inspired by the anti-immigrant impulse labeled "the new
nativism" by Gilbert Paul Carrasco, the exploitation and expulsion of immigrant labor enmeshes the Mexican and Filipino farmworker movement
in state and agribusiness disputes over land, wages, and working conditions
(pp. 310-19).
The cultural stigma marring Mexican American identity also sullies
Puerto Ricans. As a territory acquired in the Spanish-American War of
1898, Puerto Rico suffers a colonial relationship with the United States.33
American colonial rule of Puerto Rico, the editors explain, shapes legal,
political, and social status inside the territory. Rationalized by the ideology
of expansion and justified by the language of conquest, Puerto Rico's subordinate status is inscribed in both legislation and adjudication. Although
Congress granted United States citizenship to Puerto Ricans pursuant to the
Jones Act of 1917 (p. 341), Puerto Rico's commonwealth status deforms
the meaning of that citizenship for voting and equality purposes given that
the territory holds no sway in Presidential elections and commands no congressional representation (p. 347). Commonwealth status also makes possible disparate treatment of federal entitlements.
D. Asian Americans
Asian Americans, the editors contend, likewise suffer discrimination
in private and public spheres of American life. Because immigration connects both spheres, much of the focus of the Asian American chapter of
Race and Races is on immigration law. The editors point to the common
patterns of racism against all Asian Americans in immigration law despite
the historical, cultural, and linguistic diversity of the Chinese, Japanese,
Koreans, Filipinos, Asian Indians, Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians.
Even a cursory examination of the history of labor immigration shows
signs of race-based exclusion and resentment, initially against the Chinese,
as illustrated by the ban on Chinese testimony in criminal and civil cases
enacted in People v. Hall (pp. 370-73)," 4 and later against the Japanese in
equally virulent fashion. That exclusionary history triumphed over
33. Under the 1898 Treaty of Paris (p. 327).
34. 4 Cal. 399 (1854) (prohibiting admissibility of Chinese testimony against a White defendant
in criminal trial). The California legislature repealed the ban in 1872 (p. 374).
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safeguards such as civil rights protections specifically negotiated by the
Chinese government on behalf of its subjects in the Burlingame Treaty of
1868 (p. 374) and also over the more general protections of the Civil
Rights Act of 1870 (pp. 374-75). As a consequence, the Chinese faced intensifying racism not only from states, exhibited in the corporate employment restrictions of Article XIX of the California Constitution of 1879 (pp.
376-77), 3" but also from anti-Chinese hate groups (pp. 375-76). Statesponsored racism, the editors maintain, infected laundry, licensing, and
building code ordinances. The discrimination inherent in these economic
regulations, vividly displayed in Yick Wo v. Hopkins (pp. 378-81),36 was
surpassed by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (pp. 382-84), curtailing
the right to immigrate, and the Scott Act of 1888 (p. 384), restricting the
right to return. This brazen discrimination was repeated by the invidious
enactment of the 1892 Geary Act (pp. 388-90), the first race-based internal
passport system in the United States. Federal courts endorsed the exercise
of congressional power both to regulate the status of Chinese laborers (pp.
384-88) 37 and to control the flow of Chinese immigration (pp. 390-95),38
thereby condoning the nineteenth-century practice of public discrimination.
Although the first significant immigration of Japanese Americans occurred in 1885, later than that of the Chinese, they also suffered from the
enactment and enforcement of discriminatory legislation. Alien Land
Laws, such as the 1913 California Alien Land Law (pp. 398-99), and the
Washington Alien Land Law discussed in Terrace v. Thompson
(pp. 401-04),39 restricted aliens' ability to own or transfer land to those eligible for citizenship. By effectively prohibiting Japanese Americans from
qualifying for citizenship, such laws inhibited the social assimilation and
economic integration of the Japanese (pp. 401-04). The double blow of
Takao Ozawa v. United States (pp. 435-37), 0 upholding legislation rendering Japanese Americans ineligible for citizenship, and the World War II
curfew and internment orders imposed upon those of Japanese ancestry
residing along the West coast (pp. 406-12), badly undermined Japanese
citizenship status.4 These acts established the precursor for anti-Asian
35.

CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XIX (invalidated 1880) (prohibiting employment of Chinese by

California corporations).
36.
118 U.S. 356 (1886) (overturning conviction under discriminatory municipal ordinance for
equal protection violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
37. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (recognizing the plenary pover of
Congress under the Scott Act of 1888 to prohibit from entering the United States Chinese laborers who
had departed before its passage).
38. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (companion cases) (affirming
dismissal of writs of habeas corpus issued on behalf of Chinese laborers arrested for violations of the
Geary Act's internal passport system).
39. 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
40. 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
41.
See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding the validity of federal
curfew orders).
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violence. Rooted in the racial hierarchy of national identity and the attribution of "foreignness," violence against Asian Americans continues unabated, as demonstrated by the 1992 findings of the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights (pp. 397-428).
III
RACE, LAW, AND CITIZENSHIP

Race and the forces of exclusion animating the law of immigration
frame the notion of citizenship. Construed in terms of both marked and
unmarked groups, citizenship embroils the concepts of democracy and
equality, sometimes erupting in violence. Race and violence permeate the
legal history of American citizenship, coloring the grant and denial of
status, and the caste of inclusion and exclusion. Historical studies, the editors contend, confirm the privilege of color in the imagery, transparency,
and invisibility of the status of Whiteness and the caste of otherness. 42 The
editors show that White color consciousness and supremacy gave rise to
the White-cabined citizenship eligibility of the Naturalization Act of 1790
(p. 429) and to the court-determined citizenship controversies over lightskinned non-European qualification in In re Ah Yup (Chinese) (pp. 43032), 43 Takao Ozawa v. United States (Japanese) (pp. 435-37), 4 and United
States v. Bhagat Singh Thind (Asian Indian) (pp. 437-40). 41 Fanned by
class conflict, that sense of supremacy also produced violence. The editors
link conflict and violence to the ideology of White racial purity. The belief
in racial purity, they explain, motivated an anti-immigrant sentiment toward the early twentieth-century European immigration of the Irish,
Italians, and Jews (pp. 445-53), and more recently toward Vietnamese
Amerasian refugees (pp. 441-44). For James Barrett and David Roediger
(pp. 445-52), the immigrant flight to Whiteness stems from an attempt to
escape the demeaning shadow of race and the corresponding danger of
violence incited by the nationalistic fervor of Manifest Destiny and the scientific supremacy of Social Darwinism. The same flight from the color line
encourages the effort to emulate White transparency in Black-for-White
passing.
In addition to the color-coded imagery of Black-for-White passing,
the editors suggest that White privilege manifests itself through the prevalence of a White aesthetic in art and literature. The cultural regulation of
racial caste under the gaze of this aesthetic mimics and reinforces social
hierarchy. Thomas Ross (pp. 465-68) and Linda Ammons (p. 468) decipher
42.
Stefancic
43.
44.
45.

See CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado & Jean
eds., 1997).
1 F. Cas. 223 (C.C.D. Cal. 1878) (No. 104).
260 U.S. 178 (1922).
261 U.S. 204 (1923).
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elements of racial hierarchy in the image of White innocence. D. Marvin
Jones (pp. 469-70) unearths the same properties in metaphor and story. The
editors imply that these properties insidiously grip the popular imagination,
corroding visions of the racial self and other, and thereby deforming the
classical liberal conception of personhood and mutuality. Intuitively appealing, this implication garners weak empirical support from the text of
Race and Races. The editors, for example, decline to explicate the sociology of the popular imagination, estimate the White aesthetic's corrosive
effect on the racial self, or measure its disparate impact on the public and
private spheres of the self. With sparing elaboration and evidence, they
seem to reiterate the axiom of the Black-White binary paradigm of race and
extend its reach to the arts. But the cultural inscription of race requires
more than broad-brush engrafting, especially in the performing and visual
arts. To be sure, White metaphor may be tied to the racial pride, nationalism, and supremacy of the White power movement documented by Elinor
Langer's study of American Neo-Nazi groups (pp. 479-484) and Mark
Mueller's research on internet hate groups (pp. 485-86). This tie is also
displayed in the racial paranoia of on-line newsgroups (pp. 486-88). That
cultural link, however, may be frayed by the dissonance of racial commitment and betrayal illustrated by Noel Ignatiev's conception of "race
traitors" (pp. 489-93). The race traitor idea nicely illuminates the contested
role of Whites in the struggle for equality. Both Frances Lee Ansley (pp.
493-97) and Barbara Flagg (497-99) point to the centrality of identity politics, racial allegiance, and White race consciousness to that struggle.
The editors take up the concept of racial equality as it applies to both
individuals and groups. Starting from the liberal framework of equality,
embodied in current Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, they point to the requirement of "comparing individuals" and
"ensuring that likes are treated alike" (p. 500). Under this framework, they
continue, individuals are reduced to atomistic entities "absent any relation
to others" (p. 500). Reductionism of this sort, they contend, makes it appear that the harm of racism is confined to "disparate individuals
unconnected by race or by the other categories that identify and connect
people" (p. 500). Well-known to critical race theorists,46 this critique of the
liberal subject and individual harm opens the door to an enlarged concept
of group and community identity. The editors believe that a more expansive concept of identity can be found in a postmodern vision of personhood
which "recognizes that individuals are more complex than an identifying
trait" (p. 501). More accurately conceived, individuals "exist as part of
larger groups-races, families, genders, sexual orientations, and many
other vectors that comprise identity" (p. 501). Decontextualizing the
46.

See BAnARA J. FLAGG,

WAS BLIND,

Bur Now I SEE: WHrrE

RACE CONSCIOUSNESS & THE

LAW 1-65 (1998).
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individual from this identity foundation, the editors insist, results in not
only "unfair treatment," but also "a failure of equality" (p. 501). That insistence, couched within a critique of the individualized orientation of
equal protection remedies, fails to resolve the tension spurred by individual
and group competition over the scope of protection afforded by constitutional equality. Likewise, it fails to settle the conflicts between individual
equality and community sovereignty or self-determination. The editors appear to attribute this twin failure to the contested meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause, its racialized constitutional origin, and its embattled development under the neutral formalism of color-blind doctrinal rationality.
The inequitable regulation of river port pilots in Kotch v. Board of River
Port Pilot Commissioners4 7 shows the thinness of neutral rationality (pp.
506-09). The Japanese exclusion order approved in Korematsu v. United
States4" and the Mexican jury exclusion policy struck down in Hernandez
v. Texas49 demonstrate its unstable logic (pp. 511-19).
To test this logic, the editors introduce a number of readings criticizing the color-blind tenor of Equal Protection jurisprudence. For Reva
Siegel (pp. 520-33), the logic of constitutional scrutiny of racial and gender
classification is status-enforcing. Even when the classification embodies a
facially neutral policy, it incorporates existing hierarchical values and renews historical patterns of racial and gender inequity. Stephanie Wildman
(pp. 534-35) finds these values and patterns embedded in the rights discourse of anti-discrimination statutes regulating workplace equality. Parsing the application of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, she confronts
persistent strands of bias that survive in the form of unacknowledged
privilege. Examples of court-condoned privilege-based employment policies which operate differentially according to the employee's race include
the workplace grooming requirement prohibiting "corn rows" in Rogers v.
American Airlines (pp. 536-38)o and the English-only workplace speech
requirement in Garciav. Spun Steak Company (pp. 541-48).i A selection
by Mari Matsuda (pp. 551-61) shows how privilege and power may also
hinge, though less overtly, on workplace assumptions about the linguistics
of "standard" and deviant accents. Overcoming privileged positions in the
workplace, the editors admit, risks putting anti-subordination and raceconscious principles at variance. Of necessity, workplace elevation in the
47. 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (sustaining Louisiana river pilotage selection system based on practice
of nepotism).
48. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding constitutionality of 1942 civilian exclusion order directed at
persons of Japanese ancestry).
49. 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (reversing criminal conviction because of systematic exclusion of
persons of Mexican descent from service as jury commissioners, grand jurors, and petit jurors).
50. 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 198 1) (dismissing statutory claims of race and sex discrimination
in enforcement of airline grooming policy).
51.
998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting employment discrimination challenge of bilingual
workers to English-only workplace speech policy).
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form of race-conscious hiring and promotion clashes with the antisubordination principle of non-hierarchical treatment. Coupled with the
ascendant disparate treatment jurisprudence of Adarand Constructors,Inc.
v. Pena (pp. 564-70)52 limiting the ambit of affirmative action in the workplace, that clash threatens to weaken the search for equality across language, accent, hair style, dress, and skin color and, moreover, to undermine
multiracial representation in the workplace (pp. 500-79).
In the public sphere, infused by democratic norms of participation,
equality of citizenship and representation are closely allied with the idea of
voting. The editors record the historical struggle to realize this idea against
exclusionary practices endorsed by law, and enforced by state officials and
vigilante groups. Underscoring the importance of voting to equality, they
emphasize the role of law and legal rights vindication in strategic combination with political organizing and voter registration (pp. 588-89). Without this combination of advocacy and organizing, the editors fear the
continued disenfranchisement of communities of color by new methods, as
shown in the Supreme Court's acceptance of a transfer of authority away
from recently elected Black county commissioners in Presley v. Etowah
County Commission (pp. 618-30).13 Aroused by Robert Chang's account of
Asian American exclusion from avenues of political participation, they call
for the revitalization of democratic participatory norms and for heightened
practice in the "training for democracy" on behalf of both individuals and
groups (pp. 614-45).
Plainly, education stands as an essential part of democratic training.
For the editors, education is also an area where the state, the market, and
the law of property entwine with the geography of race. Using Margalynne
Armstrong's study of race and property values under conditions of entrenched segregation as a starting point (pp. 647-52), they find the roots of
educational inequality in the racialization of space caused by residential
segregation and housing discrimination. To demystify the natural order of
racialized space, the editors track the development of segregation in public
school education, culminating in the condemnation of Brown v. Board of
Education (pp. 675-82).14 The hardening of this racial order in the postBrown era sheds doubt upon the efficacy of group-oriented remedial strategies as the best means to ensure high-quality desegregated education.55 The
52. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to a minority-preference program in federal
highway construction).
53. 502 U.S. 491 (1992).
54. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregation of children in public schools solely on the
basis of race deprives the minority group's children of equal educational opportunities guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment).
55. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, TE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN CoURTS BRING ABoUr SociAL
CHANGE? 107-55 (1991); GIARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: TE SUPREME COURT
AND MiNoRrrms IN CONTIPORARY AMRICA (1993).
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Supreme Court's failure to fashion an appropriate remedy under the
Fourteenth Amendment for disparate state systems of public school financing in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (pp. 68695)56 and a similar failure to address residential patterns of segregation induced by "white flight" in Missouri v. Jenkins (pp. 697-708),"7 deepens that
sense of doubt. Commenting on the futility of litigation in the face of intractable segregation and educational inequality, Drew Days challenges the
very desirability of integration, particularly for Black males (pp. 710-22).
The erosion of the integrative ideal corresponds to a growing repudiation
of racial classifications in education and a move toward race-neutral admission procedures exemplified by the recent federal court retreat from
racial preferences to promote law school diversity in Hopwood v. State of
Texas (pp. 725-42). 8 A disturbing turn, this retreat may signal a shift in the
progress toward a more inclusive sense of citizenship and a more sensitive
racial aesthetic in American culture and society. Much of that progress
hinges on an enhanced appreciation of racial identity and group harm and
on an enlarged commitment to the public and private equality of democratic community.
IV
RACE, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY

The advance and retreat of racial community is also visible in culture
and society. Although the translation of race from politics to culture and
society is imprecise, its lexicon of color-coded discourses infuses everyday
life in the popular mind and in the law. The editors explore the indefinite
connection between race, racism, and popular culture by compiling the
demeaning artifacts of outsider imagery and narrative that construct the
daily life of racial experience. Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic assemble the artifacts of group experience from popular narrative (pp. 959-70),
showing how racial groups are similarly cast as outsiders. Margaret Russell
collects like images from modern film (pp. 970-73). The racial stereotypes
both exhibited and informed by cultural caricature extend beyond the Black
figure to infect the aesthetic of "foreignness" governing images of Asians
Americans (pp. 974-76), the "quaint" images of American Indians as vanished or strangely primitive people (pp. 991-94), and even the mythology
of Pocahontas (pp. 994-96). Linda Ammons's look at the credibility of
Black women's trial testimony demonstrates how these racial stereotypes
can play out in the courtroom (pp. 985-88). Combating caricature at trial 9
and in the arts, as Yolanda Broyles-Gonzilez observes in her account of
56.
57.
58.
59.

411 U.S. 1 (1973).
515 U.S. 70 (1995).
78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
See Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Prosecutors,Race Defenders, 89 GEo. LJ. 2227 (2001).
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the Farm Worker's Theater, depends on the mobilization of countervailing
power, racial memory, and community identity (pp. 976-79). According to
two pieces by Richard Delgado, it also rests on constraining racist impulse
through the formality of legal process (pp. 997-1001) and hate speech
regulation (pp. 1013-16).
For many, the editors admit, "free speech is a necessary condition for
community, solidarity, and self-fulfillment .... " (p. 758). Moreover, free
speech historically served the civil rights ideal by safeguarding minority
political protest, oftentimes with mixed results.6" Against this robust history of free speech guarantees to civil rights protest, the call for hate speech
regulation sounds widespread alarm among both civil libertarians and civil
rights activists, 61 even when limited to campus racial epithets. Unlike restrictions based on common law or statutory libel, 62 hate speech prohibitions rooted in the presumption of identity and community harm encounter
both judicial reluctance 63 and majority-based popular resistance, notwithstanding the doctrinal appropriateness of tort law in defamation. To the
editors, constitutionally-tailored hate speech regulation warrants sympathy
and enactment. Paradoxically, less speech may advance the denigration of
cultural identity and pluralism under "Official English" legislative initiatives (pp. 835-56). 64
For law, the paramount forum for speech is the oral, written, and social text of lawyering. The cultural denigration of the Black image and the
social subordination of the Black voice is sharply etched in the law and
lawyering of the criminal justice system. In the arena of crime and punishment, Juan Perea's astutely observed binary paradigm of White innocence
and Black guilt still largely prevails. This racialized paradigm survives in
60. Compare Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (pp. 758-64) (throwing out breach of the
peace convictions of civil rights sit-in protestors on First Amendment grounds), with Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (pp. 764-68) (affirming convictions for trespass of protestors who marched
onto the grounds of a jail to protest the arrest of civil rights demonstrators), and Walker v. City of
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (pp. 768-75) (upholding contempt sanctions against protestors who
defied an arguably unconstitutional anti-assembly injunction).
61. See Stephen G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 125 U. PA. L. REV.

193 (1996).
62. See Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (affirming criminal conviction under Illinois
libel statute); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (reversing state damage award under
Alabama libel law for violation of First and Fourteenth Amendment freedoms of speech and the press).
Compare Doe v. Univ. of Michigan., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (enjoining
63.
administrative enforcement of University of Michigan policy prohibiting hate speech because it
violated the First Amendment), and R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (proclaiming St.
Paul anti-bias ordinance facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment), with Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (approving Wisconsin penalty-enhancement sentencing statute punishing
bias-inspired conduct).
64. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) (p. 848) (vacating
challenge to Arizona official English constitutional amendment as non-justiciable controversy); Ruiz v.
Hull, 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998) (pp. 849-57) (concluding that Arizona official English constitutional
amendment violates First Amendment free speech and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights).
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spite of the recurrent White violence against Asians and Latinos (pp. 101923), the pervasive evidence of race-motivated police brutality (pp. 102834), and the disproportionate rates of Black male arrest and imprisonment
(p. 1035). Like the capital sentencing irregularities in McCleskey v. Kemp
(pp. 1076-87),65 these disparities may be attributable to racially neutral
policies, social norms, and cultural differences. Yet their unbroken continuity implies something more than neutral happenstance. Indeed, the enduring legacy of race and crime, either in the differential prosecution of
violence against women of color mentioned by Kimberl6 Crenshaw (pp.
1026-28), or in the racially based jury nullification reported by Paul Butler
(pp. 1045-47), lies in the ineradicable and seemingly evanescent quality of
bias in private offices, courtroom halls, and public streets.66
A similar bias, obdurate but elusive, marks the site of sexuality and
the family in American law. Traditionally thought of as a private realm
sequestered from the state, sexuality in communities of color, especially in
Native American and slave contexts, is heavily regulated through both
cultural and governmental encroachment. Under antebellum and postbellum regimes, the editors note, legal doctrines and evidentiary burdens bent
to accommodate White and Black hierarchy. For example, in Story v. State
(p. 886-89),67 a White woman's reputation for prostitution was not considered evidence of unchastity admissible to challenge her testimony that she
was raped by a Black man. Darren Hutchinson (pp. 890-93) and Catharine
MacKinnon (pp. 895-97) refer to the ongoing lack of juridical accommodation of difference in the marginalized treatment of gays, lesbians, and
sexual atrocity victims, specifically showing how the lack of police interest
in, and judicial awareness of, sexualized violence is exacerbated when victims are members of minority groups. The editors see some signs of progress in recent federal court decisions recognizing sexual assault as a basis
for a genocide claim according to international law and international war
crime tribunals, shifts that may signal the opening of gender hierarchies in
international law. They also look to the surprisingly recent repudiation in
American law of antimiscegenation statutes (pp. 909-18)68 as a hopeful
indication of a loosening of hierarchy-bound racial status in the field of
interracial intimacy. In the realms of reproduction and the family, however,

65. 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting constitutional complaint of race-infected capital sentencing
determinations under the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments).
66. See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997) (affirming trial court issuance of
preliminary injunction under California anti-gang public nuisance statute).
67. 59 So.480 (1912).
68. Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (p. 914-18) (striking down Virginia
miscegenation statute under Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment),
with Roldan v. Los Angeles County, 18 P.2d 706 (Cal. App. 1933) (p. 909-11) (upholding California
miscegenation statute).
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broad respite from
neither low-status women nor women of color enjoy
69
state intervention and the discourse of subordination.
V
RACE AND REFORM

The editors' exegetical reading of the sociolegal text of race in
American law and society concludes with a meditation on the role of law
and legal rights in obtaining reform. Canvassing multiple sites of racial
contestation, they urge varied methods of resistance in law, lawyering, and
political organizing. Resistance, they suggest, may spring from the logic of
law and the rights-based commitment of the reform-minded lawyer. This
optimistic stance, encouraged by Rennard Strickland's defense of AngloAmerican jurisprudence in tribal courts (pp. 1092-96), gathers strength
from the inheritance of civil rights statutes and grass-roots movements, like
that of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. (pp. 1097-1104), which attack White
supremacy by boycott and nonviolent action.
To their credit, the editors are alert to the creative tensions accompanying lawyer-engineered social change. Those tensions are inherent in
coalition work. To mitigate the tensions spawned by inter-group conflict,
they recommend interracial conflict management (pp. 1109-14). Effective
conflict resolution hinges on the recognition of common interests and
stakes. The White stake in this multiracial outcome, they assert, comes
from linking up common systems of oppression and disclosing shared
goals of community uplift. Yet as Derrick Bell and Richard Delgado comment, that stake is of uncertain measure. Absent a commitment to equality
and racial healing, the divergent experiences and realities of race inhibit
meaningful cross-racial discourse, even given the pressures of assimilation.
Consequently, the editors look inward to the classroom and to the legal
profession for opportunities to build antiracist coalitions and interracial
communities (pp. 1091-1154).
CONCLUSION

The editors' inward turn to a classroom community and to a legal
practice accepting of"an obligation to learn about race and strategize about
how it could affect each case" (p. 1154) burdens Race and Races with the
onus of prescription in pedagogy and advocacy. However praiseworthy, the
text will not bear that heavy onus. Its principles of criticism leave us normatively unguided in the classroom and floundering in the vague context
of community. Its justice mandate lacks an algorithm to weigh benefit
69. See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF
WELFARE (1994); DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND
THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997); Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiitual and Menial Housework, 9 YALE J.L.
& Faimsm 51 (1997).
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against harm or to reconcile the competing claims of the individual and the
group. Its reliance on racial intuition misplaces faith where skepticism belongs.
To render prescriptive counsel properly, the editors must confront the
tension dividing modem and postmodem modes of analysis in the critical
race movement.7" Perhaps wisely, they leave that tension unmediated. Accordingly, they declare commitments to neutrality and race-consciousness.
They condemn and exploit the hegemonic logic of law. They ridicule and
embrace formalism and process values. They celebrate multiracial identity
and assail the ill-fitting methods of advocacy and adjudication. They deplore the limitations of rights-consciousness and agitate for its renewal.
Like others devoted to race-conscious change in the law school curriculum7 and its clinics,72 and in the profession73 and its ethos,7 4 they labor in
the ambiguity of this long moment of transition. The duration of this transition, its breadth, and its outcome are uncertain. The comfort of certainty
comes only from the realization that race will continue its hold upon law
and society, inciting rancor and inspiring reconciliation. Out of extraordinary devotion, the editors have carved a far-reaching path to reconciliation
and respect in a community of race. We should be grateful for their work
and hard-earned leadership. We should hope they do not grow weary.

70. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Black and White, 85 CALIF. L. REv. 1647 (1997) (book review).
71. See Eleanor Brown, Black Like Me? "Gangsta" Culture, Clarence Thomas, and Afrocentric
Academics, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 308, 315-40 (2000); Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward
a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK LJ. 1 (1989); Randall Kennedy,
Race Relations Law in the Canon of Legal Academia, 68 FORDHAM L.REV. 1985, 1992-2010 (2000).
72. See Bill Ong Hing, Raising PersonalIdentification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity Gender,
Sexual Orientation,PhysicalDisability and Age in Lawyering Courses,45 STAN. L.REv. 1807 (1993):
Michelle S. Jacobs, Peoplefotom the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-Centered Counseling,
27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345 (1997); Kevin R. Johnson & Amagda Perez, Clinical Legal
Education and the U.C. Davis Immigration Law Clinic: Putting Theory into Practice and Practiceinto
Theory, 51 SMU L. REv. 1423 (1998); Kimberly E. O'Leary, Using "Difference Analysis" to Teach
Problem-Solving,4 CLINICAL L. REv. 65 (1997); see also Jon C. Dubin, Faculo , Diversity as a Clinical
Education Imperative, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 445 (2000); Lucie E. White, The Transformative Potentialof
ClinicalLegal Education, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 603, 605 (1997).
73. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Underrepresentationof Minorities in the Legal Profession: A
Critical Race Theorist's Perspective, 95 MICH. L. RFv. 1005 (1997); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu
Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms: An InstitutionalAnalysis, 84
CALIF. L. REv. 493 (1996); see also David B. Wilkins, Partners Without Power? A PreliminaryLook
at Black Partnersin CorporateLaw Firms, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 15 (1999); David B.
Wilkins, Social Engineers or Corporate Tools: Brown v. Board of Education and the Conscience of
the Black Corporate Bar, in RACE, LAW AND CULTURE 137-69 (Austin Sarat ed., 1997); David B.
Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop?: The Role of Legal Education in Shapingthe Values of Black
CorporateLawyers, 45 STAN. L.REv. 1981 (1993).
74. See David B. Wilkins, Beyond "Bleached out" Professionalism: Defining Professional
Responsibilityfor Real Professionals,in ETHICS INPRACTICE 207-39 (Deborah L.Rhode ed., 2000).
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Teaching by the Book
RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA.

Edited By Juan F. Perea,t Richard Delgado,t" Angela P. Harris,ttt and
Stephanie M. Wildman.tttt
St. Paul: West Group, 2000. Pp. xlix, 1171. $60.00 cloth.
Reviewed by Margalynne Armstrongi

This review of Race and Races presents a pragmatic perspective, discussing how the casebook perfomed in the classroom. I have twice assigned Race and Races as the primary text in three-unit seminars. I first
taught the materials while in manuscript form (p. v), and then used the
book in its first year of publication. Having taught similar courses with
other materials and texts, I conclude that, although the text is not flawless,
using this book helped the course to reach new heights. The editors' racially inclusive and multidisciplinary presentation excited the students and
encouraged thoughtful and respectful discussion. Student appreciation of
the book was extraordinary. One remarked, "This is the only law school
textbook that I intend to keep after I graduate."
Race and Races emphasizes the role of law in creating racial hierarchies in the United States. Although the editors of the text state that they
aspire to "present race and racism in a manner that corresponds to the racial complexity of United States society" (p. 1), their achievement is actu-

ally more focused and manageable. Given that race is constructed of "an
unstable and 'decentered' complex of social meanings constantly being
transformed by political struggle" (p. 59),1 a text that attempts to mirror the

complexity of race and racism in this society has for its subject matter an
unmanageable, incoherent, and perpetually transforming phenomenon. But
the book centers on law's role in the formation of races and racism, and
Copyright D 2001 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a California
nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their publications.
" Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Hazouri & Roth Professor of Law, University of Florida.
'I" Jean Lindsley Professor of Law, Univeristy of Colorado.
Professor of Law, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall).
t#1
t"'i Professor of Law, Santa Clara Law School.
Associate Professor, Santa Clara Univeristy School of Law. I am indebted to Marcia
Raymond for her diligent and thoughtful research assistance.
& HowARD WNairr RACIAL FoRMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 55 (2d ed.
1. MICHAEL OI,
1994).
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this theme of legal intervention in the construction of race in the United
States provides a coherent core. The text represents significant progress in
the important project of reckoning law's role in constructing and sustaining
the racial hierarchies still prevalent in our society.
I
RACE AND LAW COURSES IN OUR PECULIAR INSTITUTIONS

Race and Races helpfully addresses many of the particular challenges
that often confront Race and Law courses. These courses sometimes encounter institutional structures or consumer (that is, law student) concerns
that prohibit schools from offering these courses or that discourage student
enrollment.? First of all, not every institution among the 164 Association of
American Law Schools ("AALS") member law schools chooses to offer
Race and Law Seminars. In the 2000-2001 AALS Directory of Law
Teachers, fewer than fifty law professors self-reported themselves as
teaching this type of seminar.3 Furthermore, even when the course is offered, students may not choose to enroll in the course or may be unable to
schedule the course even if they so desire. My various race seminar sizes
have ranged from eighteen to thirty (after teaching thirty students I determined that it was important to cap the seminar's enrollment at twenty), and
students are frequently on the waiting list for the seminar.
A law student who graduates without taking a course on race and law
might leave law school having seen race presented as relevant to law only
2. At Santa Clara University School of Law, the course is offered as a seminar in Contemporary
Legal Theory. The first time I used the book, the course was described as Critical Race Theory; the
second time it was offered as Race and the Law. The Contemporary Legal Theory label is, in and of
itself, another story. When SCU began to offer "critical perspective" seminars ten years ago, such as
Feminist Jurisprudence, Critical Race Theory, and Law and Sexuality, students expressed some
concern about how having these course titles on the student transcript would look to prospective
employers. The Contemporary Legal Theory title was created to address these concerns. This generic
title would also allow the seminar professors to change course focus without having to resort to formal
course addition procedures. For example, Critical Race Theory could instead be offered as Race and
Law at the professor's discretion. Eventually even Contemporary Legal Theory became controversial.
In 1998 three professors who wanted to teach Feminist Jurisprudence, Critical Race Theory, and Law
and Sexuality under the Contemporary Legal Theory Seminar offerings in the 1998-99 academic year
were informed that this would be too many CLT offerings and that one of the seminars could not be
offered. Memorandum from Mack A. Player, Dean, Santa Clara University School of Law School, to
Professors Margalynne Armstrong, June Carbone, and Peter Kwan (March 26, 1998) (on file with
author) (noting that "three seminars on the same basic theme are difficult to justify in terms of resource
allocation and student needs" and requesting the recipients to substitute another course for one of the
Contemporary Legal Theory offerings). Feminist Jurisprudence has not been offered since 1998, having
been replaced by Contemporary Legal Theory and Women, Technology and Law. Law and Sexuality
was subsumed into one of our Jurisprudence courses that included an extensive exploration of Queer
Theory alongside other schools of legal thought. Only one section of Contemporary Legal Theory,
Asian Americans and the Law, was offered during the 2000-2001 academic year.
3.
This number was obtained by counting the seminars identified as Race and Law, Race and
Racism in the Law, or Critical Race Theory, or as specific racial groups and the law, under the Civil
Rights Course listings in the 2001 AALS Directory.
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in constitutional cases and civil rights statutes. Even in those areas the
analysis of race is inadequate. The standard constitutional law course often
omits a number of issues in which race played a predominant role, such as
slavery' and the constitutional crisis that arose from the Worcester v.
Georgia decision, in which the Supreme Court tried to insulate Indians
from state sovereignty (pp. 202-07). Fourteenth Amendment coverage
lumps together Plessy v. Ferguson (pp. 142-47), Yick Wo v. Hopkins (37881), Korenatsu v. United States (pp. 511-16), and San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez (pp. 686-95), with little or no
examination of the specific racial dynamics that spawned these cases. The
bundling leads to a one-size-fits-all mentality that analyzes race with no
reference to factual and societal context. In this way, typical constitutional
law courses structurally replicate the color-blindness discourse that permeates the current Supreme Court's Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence.
The expurgation of race from cases that deal with racial discrimination creates a void that distresses many law students.
A number of students enroll in Race and Law seminars hoping, in
their second or third year of law school, to at last focus on some of the issues of justice that inspired them to enroll in law school in the first place.
Some students simply seek a course in which their life experiences and
daily concerns may be acknowledged, articulated, and affirmed. Race and
Law is a class in which the law's legacy of differential racial treatment is
finally studied for its own content. Thoughts and reactions about the law's
racial impacts and implications that have been suppressed or discounted as
irrelevant in other classes can at last be developed and explored in some
depth.6 Race and Races is a useful text because it tackles a number of the
difficulties that most law teachers face when they offer classes on Race and
Law. All students have personally experienced the text's subject matter of
race at some level, but often from widely differing perspectives. These
varying perspectives are reflected in the expectations that students bring to
a course on Race and Law. As adult inhabitants of the Americas, we each
bring to the seminar our own matrix of cognition and understandings
relating to race that have been developing since our childhood. These preconceptions about the subject matter differ sharply from the mindset with
4. See Sanford Levinson, Slavery in the Canon of ConstitutionalLaw, 68 CI-u.-KENT L. REv.
1087, 1090 (1993).
5. Plessy v. Ferguson held that a state statute segregating train passengers by race did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. The decision effectuated the wholesale
segregation of African Americans in the southern and border states for the first half of the twentieth
century. Koreniatsu v. U.S. upheld the Executive Order and Act of Congress that authorized military
commanders to intern Japanese Americans during World War II. San Antonio School District v.
Rodriguez sustained a state public education financing scheme that allocated fewer funds to poorer
school districts, rejecting an equal protection challenge to wealth-based legal classifications.
6. See Margaret Montoya's description of what is considered irrelevant to the prevalent legal
discourse when discussing People v. Chavez in her first-year criminal law class (pp. 1148-49).
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which students enter many of their other courses. We have lived most of
our lives knowing something of race, while few of us came to civil procedure, contracts, or torts with a similar sense of knowledge. The Race and
Law course is also unusual among law school offerings because its subject
matter and its text are not generally viewed as involving neutral principles.
This is a class scrutinizing doctrine for its very non-neutrality and requiring
students to examine the course materials for insight into how prejudices
become embedded in law through the very specific frailties of the law's
human framers.
The Race and Races text confronts these problems by immediately
expanding or even exploding the understandings of race that most students
bring to the course. Its purpose is to build a common ground and present
core concepts, which the editors will refer to throughout the text. The first
chapter, "Defining Racism and Race" (pp. 5-90), jolts the reader into confronting the complexity of the commonplace by presenting a broad array of
perspectives about the phenomenon of race. Historical, international, psychoanalytic and psychological, political, and anthropological views are all
presented. Some of my students found this unsettling, complaining that the
text assumed they had background in these various areas. But the goal of
the first chapter is to get them to think outside of their previous conceptions and to understand that race scholars must analyze the subject using a
variety of tools. At the same time, this chapter provides a basic vocabulary
and introduces concepts that enable the readers to process the contents of
the upcoming chapters with some sophistication.
Later chapters continue to develop this multidisciplinary understanding of race by juxtaposing sociological, historical, and political materials
with legal texts and documents. Including political documents such as
President Andrew Jackson's first annual message to Congress of 1829 (pp.
188-90) and the 1961 Declaration of Indian Purpose (pp. 221-23) provides
rich historical and political context for examination of the role of law in the
United States Indian policy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The
section on Mexican Americans (pp. 253-326) features an excerpt from
Reginald Horsman's book Race and Manifest Destiny (pp. 254-58) that is
essential to understanding the forces behind the treaty excerpts, state constitutional provisions, and land grant cases that follow. In contrast to traditional law school texts, which barely acknowledge law's contextual
underpinnings,7 Race and Races empowers students to understand law with
much deeper insight.

7.
See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Martin Luther King, Walker v. City of Birmingham, and
the Letterf!'om Birmingham Jail, 26 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 791 (1993). Law students are sometimes
taught cases such as Walker v. City of Birmingham as illustrations of abstract legal principles totally
divorced from their historical and social underpinnings. Id. at 792.
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The foundations the editors lay in the first chapter help students to
understand the theme, found throughout the book, that lawmakers' skill at
exploiting the psychological and emotional infirmities of the general public
buttressed their abilities to manipulate race and racial status. Legally sanctioned Indian conquest and African slavery in an America ostensibly committed to democracy and freedom are not logically compatible; widespread
acceptance of these anomalies required an entire system of rationalization.
In Chapter Two (pp. 91-172), the editors illustrate the systemic foundations
of the legal oppression of persons of African descent by presenting excerpts from Benjamin Franklin's Observations Concerningthe Increase of
Mankind (pp. 98-99) and from Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia:
In general, their existence appears to participate more of sensation
than reflection ....Comparing them by their faculties of memory,
reason, and imagination, it appears to me, that in memory they are
equal to the whites, in reason much inferior, as I think one could
scarcely be found capable of tracing and comprehending the
investigations of Euclid; and that in imagination they are dull,
tasteless and anomalous (p. 101).
These selections are all-too-perfect examples of Albert Memmi's
model of the strategies used in racist and imperial discourse described in an
excerpt from Robert Williams's Documents of Barbarism (p. 26). This
model stresses the real or imaginary differences between the racist and his
victims; assigns values to these differences, trying to make them absolute;
and justifies any aggression or privilege. Jefferson's writings propound a
physiology of essential difference and absolute significance that serves to
justify the aggression and oppression involved in enslaving Africans and
expelling emancipated Blacks from White American society. Similar rhetoric infuses a number of the legal texts that appear in Race and Races, such
as Article XIX of the 1879 California Constitution (p. 376) and U.S. v.
Bhagat Singh Thind (p. 437).8 As a teaching tool to make the connections
between the first and later chapters explicit, I assigned a short written exercise requiring students to apply the Williams and Memmi analysis to the
legal text of their choice. After this assignment, the students frequently applied these introductory materials without further prompting from me.'
8. 261 U.S. 204 (1923).
9. Student application of these ideas was apparent in several of the final papers submitted for
the class. Examples include a paper wherein a student applied the writings of Iris Marion Young's
included in the section on "Racism and Theories of Oppression" in the first chapter of Race and Races
(pp 14-15). The student used Young's theories to analyze a report by the National Telecommunications
and Information Administration concerning race-based inequality of access to technology. Carla De
Silva, The Digital Divide: Is It the Modem Paradigm for Oppression in the New Millenium? (May
2000) (unpublished course paper) (on file with author). Another student paper applied Linda Hamilton
Kreiger's work on cognitive bias introduced in Race and Races (pp. 33-37) to examine the role of race
in arguments directed to juries in criminal cases. Nicole Lapcevic, The Use of Race as a Persuasive
Tool in Criminal Jury Trials (May 2000) (unpublished course paper) (on file with author).
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The U.S. v. Bhagat Singh Thind case appears in Race and Race's sixth
chapter, entitled "Race, Racism and Whites: The Case of Whiteness" (pp.
429-99). The inclusion of this chapter is important for several reasons.
First, it compels readers to recognize that White people are "raced" and
helps move away from whiteness as the presumptive norm. Secondly, it
examines the longstanding and wide-ranging legal significance of being
classified as White in the United States. The chapter shows that racism in
law consists of more than discrimination against, or protection of, nonWhite races. It describes the role of law in the creation and protection of
whiteness. Moving beyond White transparency is a great tool for enabling
all students to feel more at ease in Race and Law courses. Rather than assigning whiteness silent power and responsibility for creating racist laws,
students can see that whiteness is also a creation of racial formation.
My complaints about the book are few. As with all casebooks, an instructor must exercise professorial prerogative and cut materials or assign
them out of order. We simply could not cover the entire book. I assigned
the first nine chapters and the final chapter, "Responses to Racism," and
allowed the students to vote to select two additional chapters.' Reading the
racial category chapters in succession became tedious, so in the future I
plan to intersperse assignments from the later, topical chapters throughout
the semester.
A textbook is a rather static format for capturing a subject in constant
evolution, but it is the medium of choice for the law school classroom. The
editors try to escape the tendency of such texts to be inert by constantly
questioning and inviting the reader to bring in experiential insight, a fundamentally different approach from other law school textbooks. Professors
should enhance the course by supplementing the book with films such as
Who Killed Vincent Chin?," The Road to Brown,' z and Of Civil
Wrongs: The Fred Koremnatsu Story3 to break away from textbook stasis.
The internet has also been used very successfully as an interactive learning
device and as a forum for student and faculty projects in Race and Law
Seminars. 4

10. The students selected Chapter Twelve, "Racism and Popular Culture: Historical Images and
Current Successes," and Chapter Thirteen, "Race and Crime."
11.
Who Killed Vincent Chin? (PBS television broadcast, 1989).
12.
The Road to Brown (PBS television broadcast, Feb. 13, 1991).
13. Of Civil Wrongs: The FredKoreiatsuStory (PBS television broadcast, July 10, 2001).
14. See, for example, Professor Vemellia Randall's Race, Racism and the Law website used in
conjunction with her seminar at the University of Dayton Law School, available at
http://www.udayton.edu/--race (last modified Apr. 16, 2001). I have used my own website to post
student papers. http://www.scu.edu/law/FacWebPage/Armstrong/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2001).
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Professors of Race and Law courses often require their students to
write reflection pieces throughout the semester. Professor Charles
Lawrence describes these brief writing assignments:
Each week students are required to write a brief essay recording
their reactions to some portion of the readings for that week or to
the impact of the readings as a whole. I ask that the students use
these essays, which I call reflection pieces, as a vehicle for
reporting gut reactions or feelings evoked by the readings. I tell
them that I do not want legal analysis .... Reflection pieces serve
several purposes. Students come to class prepared. But more than
that, they come having already engaged in the process of
experiencing the harmony or dissonance between their own
perspectives and the perspectives described in the readings.1 5
I regularly assign reflection pieces in my seminars for a variety of purposes. These exercises enable students to process and articulate their reactions to the assigned materials, to relate ideas they glean from the seminar
to experiences that occur outside the classroom, or to react to the class itself. Let me end by presenting a sample reflection piece, my own. It represents the joy and anticipation that I felt as a teacher being able to use the
text to teach students in my seminar.
II
TEACHER'S REFLECTIONS, CLASS ONE

The variety of faces in the law school's seminar room
represents a triumph. Only fifty years earlier the United States
Supreme Court allowed a state to provide a legal education to its
citizens of African descent by consigning them to a roped off space
in the State capitol with three law teachers.' 6 More recently, the
admission of African American and Latino law students to public
law schools of California, Texas and Washington dwindled after
court decisions, voter initiatives and administrative policy
repudiated race-conscious admissions policies. 7 But in January
1990 the students enrolled in a Race and Law seminar, offered at a
private law school in Northern California, epitomize the state's

15. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as Struggle, 65
S. CAL. L. REv. 2231, 2247 (1992); see also Racial Reflections: Dialogues in the Direction of
Liberation, 37 UCLA L. REv. 1037 (Derrick Bell et al. eds., 1990).
16. This is what the state of Oklahoma offered Ada Sipuel after the per curiam decision in Sipuel
v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948). See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF
Brown v. Board of Education AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 257-60 (1977). The
Supreme Court later determined that such makeshift or fabricated law schools could not satisfy equal
protection in Sweatt v. Painter,339 U.S. 629 (1950).
17. See Daria Rohtmayer, Deconstructingthe DistinctionBetween Bias and Merit, 85 CALIF. L.
REv. 297, 364-65 n.3 (1988).
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future, arrived ahead of schedule." They represent a plentitude of
origins and mixtures: White, Black, Mexican, Caribbean (Afro and
Latin), Central American, Asian and Pacific Islanders, Jewish,
Sikh, Muslim. A few have strands of American Indian ancestry, but
are not affiliated with any tribe. The class represents the Diverse
America of the book's subtitle, a living connection to the text we
are about to study.

18. California is expected to become the second state in modem times (after Hawaii) in which
Whites will be outnumbered by non-Whites. The California Department of Finance's Demographic
Research Unit predicts that by July 2001 Whites will comprise less than 50% of the state's population.
But according to U.S. Census Bureau estimates for 1999, Whites totaled 49.9% of California's 33.1
million residents. Latinos comprised 31.6% of the state population, followed by persons of Asian
ancestry (11.4%), persons of African ancestry (6.7%), and American Indians (less than 1%). Soraya
Sarhaddi Nelson & Richard O'Reilly, MinoritiesBecome Majority in Slate, Census Officials Say, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2000, at Al. See also CAL. STATE DEPT. OF FIN., DEMOGRAPHIC REs. UNIT,
RAcE/ETHNIC POPULATION ESTIMATES, available at http://www.dof.ca.gov/htmUDemograp/raceeth.htm (last modified Mar. 2001).
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Edited By Juan F. Perea,t Richard Delgado,tt Angela P. Harris,ttt and
Stephanie M. Wildman.tttt
St. Paul: West Group, 2000. Pp. xlix, 1171. $60.00 cloth.
Reviewed by Robert A. Williams, Jr.
Do you believe in the rule of law, I mean really believe? Do you believe judges ought to decide like cases alike and treat people of equal worth
and human dignity equally? Do you believe that slavery and servitude, or
colonization and conquest, can never be justified by any court guided by
the rule of law? Do you believe that the rule of law is a means to a greater
end for humanity and justice for all? If so, then you should teach your students about the legal history of racism in this country. It will test all of your
beliefs about the rule of law in the White Man's America.
You will need teaching materials of course, and stories, lots of stories.
You will need to construct legal narratives and assemble other interdisciplinary resources as well. It will take a lot of work to teach this type of
"race" course. Take it from somebody who knows.
Those of us who already teach our favorite "race" courses (mine is
federal Indian law) usually have put together all that stuff, often on our
own and normally for just our own courses. There are few casebooks on
the market offering a "race" perspective on American law. A "race" perspective, as I define that term, employs the concepts of race and racism as
critical tools for examining and understanding how the dominant White
society applies the rule of law to discrete and insular minority racial groups
in America. One simply cannot find many law school casebooks adopting
this race perspective on American law. The beneficent exception is Derrick
Bell's monumental casebook Race, Racism, and American Law,' which has
Copyright 0 2001 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a California
nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their publications.
f
Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Hazouri & Roth Professor of Law, University of Florida.
"i
Jean Lindsley Professor of Law, Univeristy of Colorado.
f ff
Professor of Law, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall).
f tfif
Professor of Law, Santa Clara Law School.
*
E. Thomas Sullivan Professor of Law and American Indian Studies, University of Arizona.
J.D., Harvard Law School. Member, Lumbee Indian Tribe of North Carolina.
1. DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RAcIsM, AND AMERICAN LAW (4th ed. 2000).

1633

HeinOnline -- 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1633 2001

1634

CALIFORNIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 89:1633

had a signal imprint upon the scholarship and particularly upon the teaching and course designs of so many of the present generation of minority
legal scholars in this country.
I
TEACHING FROM A RACE PERSPECTIVE ON AMERICAN LAW

Only a race perspective both permits and requires you to tell the story
of the major racial minority groups in this country (African Americans,
American Indians, Latinos/as, and Asian Americans) as a critical chapter in
the legal history of racism in America. That is why I use a race perspective
when I teach Indian law to my students. I have studied the legal history of
how the rule of law has been applied to Indians in this country, and I could
not teach it any other way.
Because I come from a storytelling culture, I use loads of stories and
narratives in my "race" course on Indian law. I have a whole bunch of
great stories that I have collected over the years about Indian rights and the
rule of law in the White Man's America. I can tell each one in perfectly
timed, fifty-minute blocks. I have a great FarSide cartoon of the Chief of
the Manhattan Indians "addressing his tribe for the last time in 1626." I use
it to show my students how the only Indian treaty they know about before
they enter my class is a joke to most White people. I also have a slide
show, complete with a map of the voyages of European discovery during
the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. That is when the legal history of racism in America really got going, I tell my students. Another slide I show
is a portrait of Chief Justice John Marshall, in classic "dead White guy"
pose. He is the hero of the White Man's Indian law, I tell them. Without
him, some law professors say there probably would not be any Indians
around anymore.
Of course, teaching from a race perspective can depress some students
at first. You have to lighten things up at times, so I have my own canned
jokes. You should hear me rip into Columbus when I talk about the doctrine of discovery and its acceptance into United States law by Chief
Justice Marshall in Johnson v. McIntosh (pp. 175-78).2 "Dude never knew
where he was going, never knew where he was when he got there, and
never figured out where he'd been after he left. Died thinking he'd be
famous one day for discovering Japan."
A race perspective on Indian law allows me to teach my students to
question their beliefs about the meaning of the rule of law in America.
They learn about a well-elaborated and widely disseminated legal tradition
developed in Europe during the Middle Ages, a legal tradition that justified
the conquest of the "heathen" and "infidel peoples" because they were in
2.

21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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violation of Christian European natural law.3 My students learn to examine
critically how that legal tradition informed the "doctrine of discovery,"
which European nations used to justify their superior rights of sovereignty
in the New World in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.4 My students
come to understand how this doctrine led to European colonization and
conquest of the "savages" of North America on the basis of their "inferior"
character and religion. My students learn to analyze and deconstruct the
subtle form of racist reasoning used by Chief Justice John Marshall in the
case of Johnson v. McIntosh, despite his best efforts to escape detection, in
declaring the doctrine of discovery as the rule of law for Indian rights in
the United States. By developing their own critical perspectives on the role
of race and racism in Indian law, they learn to question the way courts of
law perpetuate and regulate racial power and privilege in the United States.
Teaching students how to develop race perspectives on the rule of law
in America helps them see how patterns of racial domination become embedded in American legal history. By using the categories of race and racism as central analytical tools and legal history as a principal method,
students recognize that the rule of law has been historically applied to Indian tribes to institutionalize and justify their inferior racial status in
America. Students see that horrible things happen to Indian tribes under the
White Man's law: the Removal Act's ethnic cleansing of the Cherokees,
despite Chief Justice Marshall's vain efforts to protect Indian rights in the
Cherokee Cases (p. 191-207);' the extra-constitutional imposition of an
alien culture of criminalization and incarceration in Indian Country on the
grounds of the Indians' supposed weakness and helplessness, affirmed by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Kagama (p. 213-15);6 the unilateral
abrogation of Indian treaties by Congress, upheld as a non-justiciable political question by the Supreme Court in Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock (p. 216).?
A race perspective on Indian law helps students develop a keen
awareness of the complex relationship between law, power, dispossession
and violence in the legal history of racism in the United States, through the
lens of one racial minority group's experience under the rule of law in
America. Students exposed to race perspectives in the law school curriculum gain other innumerable benefits and valuable insights. My students can
better appreciate the complexities of achieving racial justice for any racial
minority group in America.

3.
1998).

DAVID GEr-TFs Er AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 42-46 (4th ed.

4. Id. at 46-72.
5. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515 (1832).
6.
118 U.S. 375 (1886).
187 U.S. 553 (1903) (relying on the Chinese Exclusion Cases).
7.
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For example, consider the problem presented by the Supreme Court's
1974 decision in Morton v. Mancari (p. 225-28).' The Court held that a
hiring preference for Indians in the Bureau of Indian Affairs was not subject to the strict scrutiny which is typical of racial classifications challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment. At least according to the
Supreme Court's perspective on Indians and their peculiar legal status,
"Indian" is not really a "racial" classification at all. Instead, it is a
"political" classification. A race perspective helps students recognize this
classification as nonsense, but also that this nonsense provides a critical
defense for Indian preferences. As the Morton Court knew, no other racial
minority group had been treated like Indians under United States law. A
whole title of the United States Code had been constructed from the complex legal history of race, racism, and Indian rights in American law.9 Had
the Court in Morton ruled the Indian hiring preference unconstitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment, they would have had to throw a whole
volume of the United States Code out the window. In learning that Indians
have a unique legal history in the White Man's America, a history unlike
any other racial minority group's, students become more receptive to one
of the most important insights that can be gleaned from a race perspective
on American law; while there is no Bureau of African American, or
Mexican American, or even Asian American Affairs in the United States,
each of these minority groups has its own unique and undoubtedly interesting stories to tell about its historical relationship to the rule of law in
America.
II
LEARNING TO BE A RACIAL REALIST

Perhaps the most important lesson students learn from a law course
taught from a race perspective is that racial justice will not be easy to attain
for any minority group in the White Man's America. Students recognize
the harshness and rigidity of the racial attitudes that courts, including the
Supreme Court in its major race decisions, have perpetuated. For example,
students understand how threats and violence directed at Indians today,
when they try to exercise Indian treaty rights to hunt and fish off their reservation (pp. 228-30),i" reflect the Court's long history of decisions denigrating Indian legal status and rights. Students recognize the shadow of that
legal history in expressions like "Custer had the right idea" and "Go home
to the reservation; you're a conquered nation" (p. 230). Having been exposed to a race perspective on Indian law, students are not so sanguine as
8.
9.
10.
Inc., 759

417 U.S. 535 (1974).
See 25 U.S.C. (1994) (Indian Affairs)
Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Stop Treaty Abuse-Wisconsin,
F. Supp. 1339 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
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to believe that after five hundred years, the rule of law in America will start
on its own accord to recognize Indians as people of equal worth and human
dignity in this country. They realize the hard road ahead for achieving racial justice for Indian peoples. Having taken a law school course taught
from a race perspective, they know what it means to be a racial realist in
America."
As racial realists, these students understand that the precarious situation of Indian rights in America requires them to be open to new and innovative social, political, and legal approaches to problems of race and
racism in contemporary America. The increasing reliance by Indian peoples on the international human rights system for protection of their lands,
resources, and culture (pp. 236-44), for example, teaches students that alternative legal visions of indigenous peoples' rights and human dignity
exist. Through this broadened awareness, they come to understand that the
legal legacies of slavery and servitude, colonization, and conquest will
continue to undermine the very possibility of new approaches to the problems of race and racism, at least until courts adopt a much different vision
of racial justice. Ultimately, adopting a race perspective on the past, present, and future of Indian rights in America requires law students to test
virtually every prior belief they have ever had about what the rule of law
really means in this great country of ours.
III
Race and Races:

TEACHING FROM MULTIPLE RACE PERSPECTIVES ON

AMERICAN LAW

If teaching a course from the perspective of a single racial group can
give students these important benefits as part of their law school education,
then imagine the benefits that students can derive from a course that employs multiple race perspectives on American law. Such multiple race perspectives on the legal history of racism in America would teach them how
the rule of law has been applied to a much broader set of racial minority
groups in this country, as well as the different strategies those groups have
adopted to survive and create a diverse America. Race and Races: Cases
and Resources for a Diverse America provides those multiple race perspectives, focusing on a broad range of vital topics and issues of race and
racism in American law. 2

11. See Derrick Bell, RacialRealism, 24 CoNN. L. REv. 363 (1992).
12. I disclose here that I know a majority of the editors of Race and Races as good colleagues
and friends, and I find myself mentioned in the first sentence of the book's acknowledgments page,
along with generous and judiciously selected and edited excerpts from my own work on Indian rights.
And so I cannot make up some silly story about how I objectified myself into a positionality where I
adopted a detached, neutral narrative voice and then wrote a rave review about the fine job they have
done with this casebook. Please. But this is an important and in many ways singularly significant
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In its diverse and impressive range of viewpoints and perspectives,
Race and Races sets out to achieve an ambitious goal: "to present race and
racism in a manner that corresponds to the racial complexity of United
States society" (p. 1). In adopting multiple race perspectives on American
law, Race and Races, for the first time in American legal education, provides an integrated and imaginatively conceived set of published teaching
materials for a comprehensive course on the rule of law as applied to
African Americans, American Indians, Latinos/as and Asian Americans in
the White Man's America.
By incorporating a multiplicity of race perspectives into a single casebook, Race and Races is in many ways as significant an innovation as the
first casebook adopting a race perspective in the United States: Professor
Bell's Race, Racism, and American Law. Aside from this significance,
Race and Races also represents an important theoretical and practical moment in the study of race and racism in American law. Its choices on what
a casebook adopting multiple race perspectives on American law ought to
include hold the potential for reshaping the way that the next generation of
law students and lawyers responds to issues of race and racism throughout
the entire law school curriculum.
The co-editors tackle the most thorny and persistent problem that any
''race" course must address: the problem of defining what is meant by the
terms "racism" and "race." This problem is more pronounced and persistent in a course attempting to capture the diversity of legal experiences of
all the major "racial" groups in America. Race and Races confronts the
problem of defining analytical tools in its introductory chapter, and revisits,
refines, and develops new and fresh perspectives on the definition of race
and racism in American law throughout the rest of the book. Thus, in both
its structure and its content, Race and Races teaches students about the priority as well as the persistence of this central definitional problem in any
discussion of race and racism in American law.
The co-editors provide initial guidance through this definitional
thicket in their first chapter by exploring Omi and Winant's theory of
"racial dictatorship" as a way to describe the distribution of racial power in
the United States from 1607 to 1865 (pp. 12-13). Interpreting United States
history as a racial dictatorship of one race over all other races is a useful
and provocative way to organize and analyze the commonalities as well as
the particularities in the legal histories of the four minority groups studied
in the casebook. As this first chapter demonstrates, the concept of a racial
dictatorship also furthers an understanding of the hegemonic function of
the "color line" elaborated, articulated, and enforced in United States society by the master racial group. Although Omi and Winant's influential
casebook in American legal education: one well worth celebrating, with colleagues, friends, and the
legal world more generally.
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formulation of the concept of racial dictatorship helps students begin to
work their way through the problem of defining key terms, Race and Races
presents many ways in which we can define the meanings of race and racism in American law and United States society. Maintaining this multiplicity of perspectives as a persistent theme throughout the casebook is
what makes Race and Races one the most engaging, sustained interdisciplinary discussions on the concepts of race and racism ever to appear in an
American law textbook. It teaches, in powerful, empirical fashion, that
there is no one correct way to understand race and racism in America.
Rather, it recognizes the complex intersections of different modes of analysis, critique, and discourse that can be employed by adopting multiple race
perspectives on American law.
IV
CONCLUSION

Race and Races provides what I imagine most teachers of "race"
courses, and others who have never taught a course from a race perspective, have always wished they had: an interdisciplinary set of teaching
materials on the legal histories of the major minority groups in America.
The four chapters, laying out the legal histories of African Americans (pp.
91-172), American Indians (pp. 173-245), Latinos/as (pp. 246-366), and
Asian Americans (pp. 367-428), each contain the major cases that have
defined the groups' status and rights under American law, plus other, less
well-known cases that amplify the problems and issues of race and racism
in American law. Each of these chapters also includes a lively and engaging set of interdisciplinary materials and resources to provide a concise
theoretical overview of each group's legal experiences. There is even a
provocative and illuminating chapter on Whiteness, and richly-conceived
and well-integrated teaching materials arranged by chapter on central legal
issues and problems that cut across the color lines of American society.
Multiple race perspectives are presented on such diverse topics as equal
protection, voting rights, education, civil liberties, sexuality and the family,
racism in popular culture, and race and crime.
Given the gaps in most law students' legal education when it comes to
examining the role of race and racism in American law, the information
and knowledge contained in Race and Races will provide an invaluable
and previously unavailable collection of stories and legal narratives to help
students better understand the critical differences and commonalities in
how the rule of law has been applied to the different minority groups in the
United States. For many of these students, these stories will inform the way
that they evaluate how perspectives on race are incorporated in, or more
likely, excluded from, the rest of the law school curriculum. Knowing
about the important stories told in Race and Races can help students sig-
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nificantly change the way that the rule of law is thought about in American
legal education, simply by means of a raised hand in a class that has failed
to recognize the significance of race and racism in American law.
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Teaching Race Through Law: "Resources for a
Diverse America"
RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA.

Edited By Juan F. Perea,t Richard Delgado,tt Angela P. Harris,ttt and
Stephanie M. Wildman.tttt
St. Paul: West Group, 2000. Pp. xlix, 1171. $60.00 cloth.
Reviewed by Eric K. Yamamotol

INTRODUCTION

"I couldn't talk about it for over forty years. Not to my children. Not
to friends. Not a word."' The sixty-year old woman, born and raised an
American citizen, was speaking of the Japanese American internment: the
U.S. government's World War II incarceration of 120,000 Americans of
Japanese ancestry in desolate concentration camps without charges, trial or,
as ultimately shown, evidence of group-based disloyalty or military necessity.2 The woman lost her home, family business, relatives and, most important of all, her dignity and freedom. Racial vilification followed her

Copyright Co 2001 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a California
nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their publications.
'I Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Hazouri & Roth Professor of Law, University of Florida.
tf
Jean Lindsley Professor of Law, Univeristy of Colorado.
"tt
Professor of Law, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall).
ifIf Professor of Law, Santa Clara Law School.
Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, Univeristy of Hawaii. My special
thanks to Shellie Park for her research assistance.
1. Conversation following forum on the Coram Nobis Cases and the Internment, Stanford Law
School (May 1984).
2. For in-depth discussions of the Japanese American internment, the legal challenges to it, and
the redress movement, see REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTMIE RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT
OF CVLANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982);
Sandra Taylor, The Internment of Americans of Japanese Ancestry, in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH
165 (Roy Brooks ed., 1999); Eric K. Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited: Correcting the Injustice of
ExtraordinaryGovernment Excess and Lax Judicial Review-Time for a Better Accommodation of
National Security Concerns and Civil Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1 (1986); Leslie T.
Hatamiya, Institutions and Interest Groups: Understanding the Passage of the Japanese American
Redress Bill, in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH, supraat 190.
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release from years of imprisonment. Yet the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the "exclusion" (as it was euphemistically called).'
This Nisei (second-generation Japanese American) woman spoke to
me after a large public forum on the successful reopening of the infamous
World War II internment cases. Mid-1980s coram nobis4 proceedings in
Korematsu5 and Hirabayashi6 drew upon newly discovered government
wartime documents and revealed three extraordinary facts. First, before the
internment, government intelligence services unequivocally informed officials at the highest levels of the military and the War and Justice
Departments that Japanese Americans living on the West Coast posed no
serious danger to the war effort and that there existed no need for mass exclusion or internment.7 Second, the West Coast military commander based
his internment decisions on invidious racial stereotypes about the inscrutability and inherent disloyalty of Japanese Americans.8 Third, the War and
Justice Departments concealed and destroyed key evidence and deliberately misled the Supreme Court about the purported "military necessity"
basis for the internment when the Court was deciding the original
Korematsu and Hirabayshicases.'
After the forum on the coram nobis cases, the Nisei woman waited
and spoke quietly. "I knew we didn't do anything wrong, but the President,
Congress, and the courts said the internment was right. I came to seriously
doubt myself." But then, years later, "our children and many [non-Japanese
American] friends fought to clear our name. They opened our eyes to why
this all happened to us, and also to why others in America have been so
badly treated, like the Blacks. Maybe we'll get reparations." She concluded, "Now I can talk about it. This has freed my soul."'"
Race and Races: Cases and Resources for a Diverse America, by
Juan Perea, Richard Delgado, Angela Harris, and Stephanie Wildman, is
3. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (declaring constitutional under the Fifth
Amendment Due Process clause the federal government's World War II exclusion of persons of
Japanese ancestry (primarily United States citizens) from West Coast areas, leading to their indefinite
incarceration without charges or trial); see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943)
(declaring constitutional the federal government's World War II curfew imposed only upon persons of
Japanese ancestry, including United States citizens).
4. A writ of coram nobis is an extraordinary court-issued writ that operates to rectify "manifest
injustice" in the judicial process by correcting fundamental errors in criminal proceedings. The writ is
rarely issued. It is used to "clear the name" of a wrongfully convicted defendant after conviction,
appeal and imprisonment. (By contrast, the related habeas corpus writ is used to free a criminal
defendant wrongfully held in custody.) See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954).
5.
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984). I served as a member of the
legal team representing Fred Korematsu in his coram nobis case.
6. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987).
7. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1416; Hirabayashi,828 F.2d at 600.
8. Korematsu, 584 F.Supp. at 1416-17.
9. Id.; see also Eric K. Yamamoto, Friend,Foe or Something Else: Social Meanings of Redress
and Reparations,20 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 223, 226 (1992).
10. See supra note 1.
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the first multiracial, multidisciplinary casebook for courses on Race and
American Law. It succeeds spectacularly as both pedagogy and scholarship. As a law teacher I feel, at last, that I have a casebook for class that
really helps us "talk about it." And while it may not free our souls, the
casebook will inspire students and significantly elevate the teaching of
Race and American Law and related courses to new levels of breadth and
sophistication.
Before Race and Races, I and many other teachers compiled our own
course readers, a hodgepodge of constantly changing materials drawn from
a variety of sources, without introductions, transitions, or notes and questions. These ad hoc readers worked well enough because of the thought
behind them, the wealth of materials available, and the support of Derrick
Bell's magnificent treatise, Race, Racism and American Law." What was
missing, however, was a multiracial and multidisciplinary text that looked
like a casebook, with its cases, statutes, and notes, but that also brought a
critical edge to traditional constitutional law and civil rights casebooks'
handling of racial justice issues. What we needed was a casebook that
would enable us to systematically explore race and law in all its often oppressive but occasionally liberating dimensions. Overall, Race and Races
does this in exemplary fashion. Race and Races will serve as a standard
bearer for critical-theory-informed casebooks generally 2 and for more specialized race and law casebooks to follow. 3 Race and Races gives us what
we need to "talk about it."
To complement these broad observations, I will first highlight some of
the specific salutary dimensions of the casebook. I will then follow with a
critique of two areas in which the book can be strengthened for its next
incarnation.
I
STRENGTHS

OF Race andRaces

The list of highlights is long. To start, the editors are highly respected
scholars. While their writings range across the spectrum of subjects, their
critical race theory scholarship places them at the cutting edge of debates
on racial justice. 4 This is significant because their theoretical choices
11.
DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW (4th ed. 2000). Some use this
comprehensive and in-depth treatise as a course book.
12. For another standard bearer, in the area of contracts and commercial law, see Amy HILSMAN
KASTELY ET AL., CONTRACTING LAW (2d ed. 2000).
13. See, e.g., GABRIEL J. CHIN & SUMI CHO, ASIAN AmERICANS AND LAW (forthcoming 2001);
ERic YASIAOTo Er AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
INrERNmENT (2001).
14. See, e.g., IMIGRANTS OuT (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997); RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO

CRoNICE..S (1995); Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 581 (1990); PRIVILEGE REvEALED (Stephanie Wildman ed., 1996).
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about how questions of race and racism should be presented to students
also illuminate the larger intellectual enterprise of rethinking race, rights,
and justice in the new century.
Race and Races' Introduction and opening chapter set the theoretical
stage. They are not to be missed in a rush to the cases. The Introduction
provides a list and brief explanation of tools of critical inquiry (p. 3), which
gives students an immediate handle on the book's approach. I ask students
to refer back to these rough queries as they read throughout the
course: "Make the Implicit Explicit," "Look for the Hidden Norm,"
"Avoid We/They Thinking," "Remember Context," "Seek Justice,"
"Consider the Harm," "Trust Your Intuition," and "Ask, Who Benefits?"
They serve as a kind of primer for critical inquiry. Significantly, these queries are framed less as commands and more as questions. The book's critically informed approach is imparted with a light hand.
The first chapter does a masterful job of handling the difficult problem of defining race and racism. Its approach is to use tightly edited articles, drawn from both legal and social science scholarship, followed by
insightful notes and questions. The carefully framed excerpts from Omi
and Winant on racial dictatorship (pp. 12-13), Young on theories of oppression (pp. 14-15), Blauner on internal colonialism (pp. 16-20), Williams
on Memmi's discursive strategies of racism (pp. 26-28) (my students find
Memmi particularly incisive), Krieger on the cognitive psychology of discrimination (pp. 33-36), Lawrence on cultural meaning and the equal protection intent requirement (pp. 37-41), Foster on environmental justice (pp.
46-48), Feagin and Feagin on "scientific" conceptions of race (pp. 56-58),
Gotanda on critical conceptions of race (pp. 61-63), and Hernandez (pp.
69-77) on census racial categories, produce an extraordinary quilt of basic
legal and sociological concepts. Working through each of these essays and
linking them to one another creates an intellectual framework for the
course, and is, in my experience with the book, an exceedingly valuable
investment of teaching time and effort.
After this theoretical introduction, the book moves through group legal histories and then to substantive themes. This organizational structure
works well. I find teaching group identity history first provides a necessary
foundation for students in a course on race, since many of them lack historical grounding. The sequential coverage of African Americans,
American Indians (to which I add Native Hawaiians), Latinos/as, Asian
Americans and Whites enables me to teach legal history as a complex story
about race in America, a story that, with variations, repeats over and over.
It also enables me to introduce themes that we will explore later in greater
depth, such as Reva Siegel's "preservation-through-transformation" thesis
about equal protection jurisprudence and its tendency to transform itself in
response to pressures for change while preserving status inequalities in new
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forms. 5 The African American chapter (pp. 91-172), for instance, does this
superbly. With a critical eye, and using multidisciplinary materials (the
Lavinia Bell interview (pp. 112-14) alone transforms students' grasp of
slavery), the chapter takes us from the Constitution's framers through slavery, Reconstruction, Jim Crow, the NAACP, the Civil Rights Movement
and contemporary racism.
The book then moves to themes, or issues. By the second half of the
course students are hungry for in-depth conceptual study, and the thematic
chapters deliver. The themes range widely, developing notions of equality,
voting, segregation in housing and education, freedom of expression, sexuality and the family, popular culture, crime, and responses to racism. This
range allows teacher to pick and choose from a cornucopia of topics. No
one can teach it all. All of these thematic chapters are thoughtfully prepared and deep, some of them are striking and innovative. For instance, the
carefully integrated chapter on "Race, Sexuality, and the Family" (pp. 866958) and the compelling chapter on "Racism and Popular Culture" (pp.
959-1016) can be found in no other teaching materials, and certainly not in
any casebook.
What Race and Races does far better than any traditional casebook is
introduce, without imposing, tools of critical inquiry and provide the multidisciplinary "resources" (as the book's subtitle says) for contextualized
and particularized analyses. It is an approach invaluable not only for teachers and students, but also for scholars interested in a broad grounding in
race and law.
II
CRITIQUE

Race and Races, though excellent overall, has some shortcomings in
specific areas that should be addressed in subsequent editions. I will discuss improvements I would like to see in the two areas with which I am
most familiar: Asian Americans and Reparations for Historical Injustice.
A.

Asian Americans

"Asian Americans" (pp. 367-428) is the casebook's one weak chapter.
It is the book's shortest chapter, half the length of the strong "Latinos/as"
chapter (pp. 246-366). Page length itself is not especially important. What
is important, however, is the Asian American chapter's overly narrow focus and omission of key study areas. The picture presented by the chapter
is skewed.

15. Reva Siegel, Why the Equal Protection Clause No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111 (1997); see also Reva Siegel, "The Rule of
Love ". Wife Beating as PrerogativeandPrivacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996).
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The chapter focuses on only two Asian American ethnic groups: the
Chinese and Japanese. This leaves out of the Asian American picture the
dramatic impact of the 1965 Immigration Act reform 6 on the immigration
of Filipinos, Vietnamese, Koreans, Indians, Laotians, Cambodians, and
Hmong. These "other" ethnic Asian Americans collectively far outnumber
Chinese and Japanese Americans 7 and have dramatically changed how we
grapple with Asian Americans in U.S. law and culture. For example, it was
the immigration of these Asian groups along with Latinos/as that became
the target of California's anti-immigrant Proposition 18718 in 1994, which,
in turn, spurred anti-immigrant legislation across the country. 9 The omission of these Asian ethnic groups from the chapter, save for brief references in two of the articles, will feel inadvertently exclusionary to many
Asian American students and teachers. More importantly, the chapter creates a distorted vision of Asian America and its connections to contemporary American law.
One half of the chapter is devoted to the law's treatment of Chinese
Americans in the nineteenth century. While this was an early formative
period in Asian American legal history, it does not warrant five of the nine
subsections of the chapter, especially because the notes and questions following each section are sketchy and do not provide enough substance to
connect meaningfully with other Asian American and law issues, historical
or current. Unlike the other chapters' notes and questions, these have the
feel of limited preparation.
The chapter does a somewhat better job of handling Japanese Americans. It nevertheless falls far short in key areas. The very brief discussion
of anti-Japanese initiatives before World War II (pp. 397-406), crucial to a
contextual understanding of the internment, is barely adequate. The selected materials on the Alien Land Law (pp. 398-404), which prohibited
Japanese ownership of land as a way of blocking their ability to compete as
farmers, are quite good. But the brief questions after the statute and the

16. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §1-14354) (eliminating discriminatory national origin quota system in place since
1924 for U.S. immigration law).
17.

See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION,

323 tbl. 253 (1992); see also Gregg Van DeMark, Too Much
ofa Good Thing, Plyerv. Doe, and American Hubris, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 469 (1996).
18. Proposition 187, approved Nov. 8, 1994 (Initiative Statute: Illegal Aliens: Public Services,
Verification, and Reporting) (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 113, 114, 834(b) (West 1999))
(establishing a state screening system to prevent undocumented immigrants from obtaining state
benefits, including public education for children).
19. See generally Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as at 42 U.S.C. § 1305) (cutting off welfare benefits to
legal immigrants); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.) (authorizing indefinite
detentions of aliens with criminal records).
GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERIsTIcs
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case give short shrift to the significance of these laws and do not foster student discussion about the legal setting for the internment.
A more important issue is what I consider to be the chapter's faulty
handling of the Japanese American internment cases. The internment was a
defining moment for Japanese Americans and for many other earlier Asian
American immigrants. It signaled the law's ostensibly neutral but-inreality-political treatment of Asian Americans and, by extension, all
"outsiders" in America, at least in times of national stress. The Korematsu
case, and its challenge to the legality of the internment, are still taught in
many constitutional law courses and in almost all race and law courses. It
is a case significant to scholar's understanding of constitutional law. And
my story of the Nisei woman at the opening of this review offered a
glimpse of the human depths of the underside to this racial story, and the
importance of giving it voice.
Yet the chapter's Japanese American section (pp. 397-412) barely
touches upon the internment issue, only five pages in all. An excerpt by
Takaki (pp. 407-11) does provide a picture of the assembly processing
centers and internment camps. But the internment cases receive next to no
attention, one and a half pages. There is no analysis of the government's
assertion that "military necessity," that is, Japanese Americans' perceived
cultural propensity toward disloyalty and acts of espionage and sabotage,
justified the internment. There is no discussion of the "extraordinary facts,"
recited at the beginning of the Review, 20 which showed that key government officials knew that no military necessity basis for the internment existed, that the internment decisions were based on racial stereotypes, and
that the government deliberately destroyed, suppressed, and altered all evidence of these facts in its presentation to the Supreme Court. After a short
set-up, the chapter briefly quotes the HirabayashiSupreme Court opinion.
Neither equal protection analysis nor political commentary follows. No
notes and questions examine the Court's rationale. No reference is made to
the Hirabayashicoram nobis Ninth Circuit opinion in 1987 vacating Hirabayashi's conviction because of "manifest injustice" in the government's
prosecution of the original case.2'
Most disconcerting, the section dismisses the Korematsu case in three
perfunctory lines and a citation, without any hint of its legal or social significance then or now, without any mention of the egregious governmental
misconduct in prosecuting the case in concealing and fabricating evidence
on "military necessity," without any linkage of the revelation of that government misconduct in the Korematsu case to the subsequent congressional
authorization of reparations for former internees (reparations are mentioned

20.
21.

See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987).
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in a note at the section's end). 2 Although the Korematsu case is reproduced in a later chapter on equality, the casebook's dismissive treatment in
the Japanese American section of the Asian American chapter, along with
the overall superficial treatment of the internment and the silence about the
coram nobis litigation, leaves a huge gap in this chapter of the casebook.
The chapter's section on contemporary issues, with selected excerpts
from Chang on the "model minority" (pp. 412-18), Saito on Asian
American "foreignness" (pp. 419-422), and Kang on hate violence (pp.
423-28), is much stronger. The articles raise current and often vexing issues for Asian Americans. The notes and questions for this section, however, are sparse and, generally, superficial. Many teachers not versed in
Asian American legal issues may be tempted to skip the material.
The chapter could be significantly strengthened by addressing the
aforementioned critiques. This could be done without adding many pages,
particularly if the Chinese American section is shortened. The chapter
could also be enhanced by the incorporation of cases raising contemporary
Asian American legal issues, such as hate and economic violence, current
immigration dynamics, labor rights, interminority conflict, and civil rights.
My suggested additions would include Vietnamese Fishermen's
Association v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan23 (White fisherman enlisting the
KKK to terrorize legal immigrant Vietnamese fisherman in Texas), Ho v.
24
San Francisco Unified School District
(Chinese Americans successfully
challenging a thirteen-year old public school desegregation consent decree
achieved by the NAACP as an equal protection violation), Proposition
18725 (Asian American and Latino/a groups succeeding in having the antiimmigrant initiative invalidated), Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu26 (Filipino immigrant with top job qualifications denied city position
because of accent), Vincent Chin sentencing2 7 (probation sentence for angry unemployed White auto workers who, mistaking Chin for a Japanese
person, beat his brains out of his head with a baseball bat), and Thai Garment Workers2 (immigrant Thai women enslaved for years in an El Monte,
22. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b-4(a)(1) (1988) (authorizing $20,000
reparations payments to every surviving internee). See generally WILLIAM MINORU HoRim, REPAIRING
AMERICA: AN AccouNT OF THE MOVEMENT FOR JAPANEsE-AMERICAN REDRESS (1988) (describing

the linkage of "governmental misconduct" lawsuits to the overall redress movement); H.R. REP. No.
278, at 9 (1987) (in debating the Civil Liberties Act, recognizing that the original Supreme Court
decisions upholding the internment had been repudiated by scholars, former government officials and,
most recently, by the federal courts); Jacobs v. Barr 959 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 831 (1992) (citing impact of coram nobis cases on reparations).
23. 543 F. Supp. 198 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
24. 965 F. Supp. 1316 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
25. See supranote 18.
26. 888 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1989).
27. United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422 (6th Cir. 1986).
28. Bureerong v. Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450 (C.D. Cal. 1996); see also Julie A. Su, Making the
Invisible Visible: The Garment Industry's Dirty Laundry, 1J. GENDER RACE & JusT. 405 (1998).
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California garment factory, suing clothing retailers who commissioned the
garments).
B. Reparations
The second area for enhancement is reparations. Reparations have
come to the fore as part of American, and indeed worldwide, racial justice
law. In the United States in 1999, the federal government settled a
multimillion dollar reparations claim by African American farmers that
were deliberately excluded from the Department of Agriculture's loan programs. 29 Tulsa is in the process of conferring reparations for the mayhem
inflicted by White residents on African Americans in the 1920s," much
like the reparations for the African American survivors of Rosewood in
Florida." Aetna Insurance Company apologized and paid reparations for its
past discriminatory insurance practices.12 African Americans have announced the filing of class action reparations claims against businesses that
profited from slavery and Jim Crow segregation,33 and Congressperson
John Conyers has proposed an African American Reparations Study
Commission bill.3 Native American tribes and Native Hawaiians have
reparations claims pending for treaty and sovereignty violations, as well as
for breaches of land trusts. Japanese Latin Americans are demanding
reparations for their kidnapping and internment by the United States during
the Second World War.36
Internationally, former Korean sex slaves are seeking reparations from
the Japanese government, 37 and former worker slaves, abducted by the
Japanese government during World War II, are claiming compensation
from the private industries that benefited from their slave labor.3" Similarly,

worker slaves for Germany are receiving litigation-induced reparations
29. Salim Muwakkil, USDA Settlement Advances Argument for Reparations, CHi.TmB., Jan. 18,
1999, at N15.
30. Brent Staples, Unearthinga Riot, N.Y. TimEs, Dec. 19, 1999, at 64.
31. Lori S. Robinson, Growing Movement Seeks Reparationsfor U.S. Blacks, ARIz. REPUBLIC,
June 22, 1997, at HI. (awarding $150,000 to each of the nine survivors of the 1923 massacre where a
White mob killed six Blacks and burned down the Black community of Rosewood, in addition to
awarding between S375 and S22,535 to 143 descendants for lost property).
32. Michelle R. Davis, Charleston, Like U.S., Hates to Think About Its History of Slavery, THE
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 11, 2000, ZS-1.
33. Jack Hitt, Making the Casefor RacialReparations, HARPER'S MAG., Nov. 1, 2000, at 3751.
34. Politicians,Scholars Voice Supportfor Slavery Reparations,JET, May 15, 2000, at 48.
35. Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims for Reparations, Compensation, and Restitution in the
United States Legal System, in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH 261 (Roy Brooks ed., 1999); ELAZAR
BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONs 216 (2001) (analyzes reparations claims by Native Hawaiians).
36. Natsu Saito, Model Minority, Yellow Peril: Function of "Foreignness" in the Construction
ofAsian American Legal Identity, 4 AsIAN L.J. 71 (1997).
37. GEORGE L. HIcKS, THE CoNioRT WomEN 189 (1995).
38. Lawsuits to Seek Billions in Compensation from Japanese Corporations that Used Slave
LaborersDuring WWII, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 22, 2000.
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from private businesses.39 The South Africa Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, its formal work completed, still oversees the halting reparations program it recommended to help heal the wounds of apartheid.40
Roy Brooks says we are amid an "Age of Apology."'4' I would modify
that phrase and, borrowing from Elizabeth Spellman, say we are in the
' Repair, rather than compensation,
"Age of Reparation."42
is the root word
of reparation. Indeed, we have entered an era in which communities, governments, and nations are attempting, through the varying forms of reparations, monetary and nonmonetary, to repair the enduring personal and
societal damage of injustice.4 3
The concept of reparation thus deserves an extended treatment in Race
and Races. Reparations, in the form of monetary awards, are mentioned in
various places in the book (for example, in a brief note following the discussion of the Japanese American internment (pp. 411-12)). In addition,
the excellent chapter on "Responses to Racism" (pp. 1091-1154) includes
one article that discusses reparations in a more general sense (pp. 1123-28).
That chapter, however, covers a lot of other important ground, including
coalition-building, resisting White supremacy, and racial healing, and
would become unwieldy if it was expanded to incorporate a fully realized
reparations section.
What would enhance the casebook most is a separate chapter that engages rapidly developing reparations theory in the context of past and
pending worldwide and national reparations movements.' Such a section
would distinguish between legal (that is, court-asserted) claims for reparation and those focused on legislative, or even private, action. It would also
explore the social psychological impact of the various forms of reparations
and examine the dynamics of the reparations process, both its salutary potential and its underside.4 5 It would enable its readers to assess bona fide
39. William Drozdiak, Germany Signs Pact to Compensate Nazi Slaves, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
July 18, 2000, at 1.
40.
Michelle Sieff, Rights-South Africa: Apartheid's Victims DemandReparations, INTER PRESS
SERV. Feb. 21, 1999, available at 1999 Westlaw, WL 5947136.
41.
Roy L. Brooks, The Age of Apology, in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH, supra note 35, at 3
(analyzing significant reparatory efforts in the United States and worldwide); See also MARTHA
MINOW, BEYOND VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS (1998) (providing concepts, ranging from vengeance
to forgiveness, for assesing government and social group responses to historic injustice).
42.
See ELIZABETH SPELLMAN, FRUITS OF SoRRow: FRAMING OUR ATTENTION TO SUFFERING
(1998) (revealing the multiple dimensions of the concept of"repair").

43.

See generally ERIc K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION

IN PosT-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA (1999); JOSEPH SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES
PROPERTY (2000); BARKAN, supranote 35; RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT (2000).

44.

OF

See Yamamoto et al., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION, supranote 13; Brooks, supra note 41;

MINOW, supra note 4 1; SPELLMAN, supra note 42, YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 43.

45. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African
American Claims, 40 B.C. L. REv. 477 (1998); Chris Iijima, Reparations and the "Model Minority"
Ideology of Acquiescence: The Necessity to Refuse the Return to Original Humiliation, 40 B.C. L.
REV. 385 (1998).
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reparation efforts and identify those that aim simply for "cheap grace.
The interest in such a chapter, I suspect, would be considerable. Recall the
sixty-year-old Japanese American woman who said that only now, after the
revisiting of the internment cases, did she also see how badly African
Americans had been treated in the United States. Only now could she hope
for reparation.
In sum, Race and Races: Cases and Resources for a Diverse
America, is a remarkable pedagogical and scholarly achievement. It defmes a burgeoning field. It inspires. It works, for teachers and students. We
now have a Race and Law casebook that enables us to "talk about it."

46.

YAMAMOTO, INrERRACiAL JUSTICE, supranote 43, at 175.
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Book Review
Thinking About Race and Races: Reflections and
Responses
RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA.

Edited By Juan F. Pereat Richard Delgadott Angela P. Harris,ttt and
Stephanie M. Wildman.tttt
St. Paul: West Group, 2000. Pp. xlix, 1171. $60.00 cloth.
Certain absences are so stressed, so ornate, so planned, they call
attention to themselves; arrest us with intentionality and purpose,
like neighborhoods that are defined by the population held away
from them ....The spectacularly interesting question is "What
intellectual feats had to be performed by the author or his critic to
erase me from a society seething with my presence, and what effect
has that performance had on the work?" What are the strategies of
escape from knowledge? Of willful oblivion?
Toni Morrison'
I
REFLECTIONS ON RACE AND RACES

The presence of people of color haunts the United States. Race and
racism are central to the history, the mythology, and the basic institutions
of American life, including American legal institutions. Yet American
public discourse has seldom been forthright about the existence and implications of American racism. Thus, for example, prior to the Thirteenth
Amendment in 1865, the Constitution never mentioned the word "slavery."
The drafters of the Constitution were scrupulously careful not to include
the word anywhere in the document, even as they crafted compromises that
protected and recognized the peculiar institution.2
Copyright ©c2001 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a California
nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their publications.
'r
Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Hazouri & Roth Professor of Law, University of Florida.
I
Jean Lindsley Professor of Law, Univeristy of Colorado.
'if Professor of Law, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall).
i1t Professor of Law, Santa Clara Law School.
1. Toni Morrison, Unspeakable Things Unspoken: The Afro-American Presence in American
Literature, in WITHIN THE CIRCLE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN LITERARY CRITICISM
FROM THE HARLEM RENAISSANCE TO THE PRESENT 378 (Angelyn Mitchell ed., 1994); see also TONI
MomRSON, PLAYING IN THE DARK (1992).
2. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RAcIsM AND AMERICAN LAW 46-48 (4th ed. 2000) (listing the
clauses that protected the institution of slavery).
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The framers maintained this constitutional silence, it seems, to preserve the ideological integrity of the document.' More recent silences about
race in legal discourse seem intended to protect the public from being confronted with the enormity of racial injustice. For example, in decisions like
Shaw v. Reno,4 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia,5 and Rice v.
Cayetano,6 the Supreme Court has found governmental racial classifications unconstitutional under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
even when their purpose has been to ameliorate racial inequality and
strengthen the political power of racialized and historically subordinated
communities. In McCleskey v. Kemp,7 the Court refused to recognize a
claim of systemic racial discrimination in the administration of the death
penalty for fear of undermining the criminal justice system itself, a fear
dissenting justice William Brennan described as "a fear of too much
justice."' In these and other decisions, the Court has treated government
recognition of race as inherently divisive and antidemocratic. Yet these
decisions, imposing public silence on the issue of race, have had the practical effect of maintaining historical and continuing racialized inequalities of
political and economic power.
The repercussions of this silence about the racialized injustice that so
pervades American society are perhaps most haunting in areas that public
discourse treats as race-free. In its recent decision in United States v.
Morrison,9 for example, the Court held that Congress lacked authority under either the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to create a federal civil remedy for victims of gendermotivated violence, thus invalidating a portion of the Violence Against

3.
In debating the wording of Article I, Section 9, which prohibited Congress from using its new
commerce powers to restrict the importation of slaves, Speaker of the House Dayton was unambiguous
about the reason for omitting the word "slave" from the constitutional text:
[1]n the discussion of its merits, no question arose, or was agitated respecting the admission
of foreigners, but, on the contrary, that it was confined simply to slaves, and was first voted
upon and carried with that word expressed in it, which was afterwards upon reconsideration
changed for "such persons," as it now stands .... The sole reason assigned for changing it
was that it would be better not to stain the Constitutional code with such a term, since it could
be avoided by the introduction of other equally intelligible words, as had been done in the
former part of the same instrument, where the same sense was conveyed by the circuitous
expression of"three fifths of all other persons."
Debate in the House of Representatives (June 16-20, 1798), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL

CONVENTION OF 1787, at 377 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
4. 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (redistricting legislation that is "unexplainable on grounds other than
race" demands strict scrutiny).
5. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (strict scrutiny is appropriate for all government racial classifications,
whether created by federal or state governments).
6. 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
7. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
8. 481 U.S. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). See also Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(200 1) (declaring state governments immune from suit under the Americans With Disabilities Act).
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Women Act (VAWA). ° Reviewing the scope of congressional power under Section 5, the Court held that because the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to state action, Congress had no power to create a civil remedy
against private persons who engage in gender-motivated violence. This
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is not compelled by the constitutional text itself, however, but is based on two cases decided shortly
after the adoption of the amendment, United States v. Harris' and the Civil
Rights Cases.'2 According to the Morrison Court:
The force of the doctrine of stare decisis behind these decisions
stems not only from the length of time they have been on the
books, but also from the insight attributable to the Members of the
Court at that time. Every Member had been appointed by President
Lincoln, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, or Arthur-and each of their
judicial appointees obviously had intimate knowledge and
familiarity with the events surrounding the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment."3
What the Court does not say is that when these cases were decided,
the Supreme Court was engaged in a war with Congress over race and racism: a war in which the Court moved time and time again to thwart the
project of making African Americans equal citizens. Akhil Amar points
out, for example, that the intent behind section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment reflected, in part, congressional desire to overrule the Court's
infamous decision in DredScott 4 that Blacks in America had no rights that
White persons were bound to respect. 5 Amar asks why the Rehnquist
Court should choose to look for meaning in the interpretations of a hostile
Supreme Court and not in the statements of the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment.6
The Court's silence about our racial past has not only skewed its approach to statutory interpretation. Robert Post and Reva Siegel argue that
10. In deciding the Commerce Clause issue, the Court relied on its analysis in United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The Court held that, while the line between the economic and
noneconomic is not always crystal clear, "[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense
of the phrase, economic activity." Morrison,529 U.S at 613.
1I. 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
12.
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
13. Morrison,529 U.S. at 622.
14. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
15. Akthil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term: Foreword: The Document and the
Doctrine, 114 HARv. L. REv. 26 (2000).
16. As Amar argues:
Many of the Congressmen supporting these laws had been leading architects of the
Fourteenth Amendment itself. Why doesn't Chief Justice Rehnquist accord these men any
epistemic respect? Founders such as James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, who lived and
died as slaveholders, are treated with reverence by the Court (even though Jefferson was not
even in America at the Founding). Why are Reconstructors like John Bingham and Charles
Sumner, crusaders for racial justice, treated with so much less respect?
Id. at 105-06.
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the substantive scope of congressional power under Section 5, and the
meaning of Section l's guarantees, can be understood only by understanding our nation's long political and legal struggle over racial injustice. 7 In
passing over this history in silence, they argue, the Court's recent decisions
concerning congressional power to pass antidiscrimination legislation
threaten to construct a jurisprudence that is not only "mechanical" but may
8
diminish the authority both of the Court and of the Constitution itself.
The silences, omissions, and strained reasoning in these cases are not,
in our view, the result simply of faulty reasoning or a misunderstanding of
precedent. Rather, the cracks in Morrison's analysis, and in the Court's
jurisprudence of congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment
more generally, betray the effort required to ignore a central truth of
American jurisprudence: that the constitutional principles of federalism
and separation of powers on which Morrison and like cases turn are inextricably intertwined with the history of race and racism.
As the majority in Morrison acknowledged, "the principle that the
Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers, while reserving a generalized police power to the States is deeply ingrained in our
constitutional history."' 9 But this principle, in turn, is seething with the
presence of slavery, conquest, racial terror, and apartheid. These are the
unquiet ghosts in the machine of federalism jurisprudence. Race and Races

17. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
LegislationAfter Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000). Post and Siegel write:
The Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment knew that it could not establish
equality for the newly freed slaves without reaching deep into Southern society and reforming
its fundamental principles. That is why it drafted Section 5. But the Supreme Court, fearing a
disruption of the balance of the federal system, refused to allow this exercise of federal
power, and instead created doctrines that shielded the right of state legal systems to segregate
and the freedom of private property owners to discriminate.
Even after the gates of federal power were thrown open during the New Deal, it was still
not clear whether the national government had the power to overcome these deeply inbred
practices and principles of discrimination. It was not until Brown changed the standards of
Section Ithat this objective became imaginable. And even then, it was not until thousands of
protests forced the federal hand that Congress was finally willing to enact the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to accomplish what the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought they had
achieved.
When we speak of using the values of federalism to restrict the scope of federal power in
the context of national antidiscrimination statutes, therefore, we are speaking of a trust put
into federal hands by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, taken away by the Court for
almost a century, but, after struggle, returned to national authority in the 1960s. This
assumption of federal authority was vindicated by all three branches of the federal
government. The question of federalism thus merges with the question of the federal
government's proper role in combating discrimination. For whatever might be said about
Section 5 power generally, the use of Section 5 power to combat unconstitutional
discrimination cannot be conceived as a potential threat to the legitimate balance of the
federal system so long as this history retains its normative force.
Id. at 507-08.
18. Id. at 446.
19. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619 (internal quotations omitted).
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is our attempt to give form and substance to the unquiet ghosts whose stories lie deep in American legal and constitutional history.
As one of us has recently noted, the story of "race law" is ordinarily
taken to be the story of equality law.2" In this equality story, despite many
setbacks, "We, the People" gradually enlarges to embrace everyone.
African Americans are the central characters in this story. Their inspiring
journey from slavery to freedom, from apartheid to the American mainstream, is taken as a metonym for the optimistic story of American racial
struggle generally, a story that ends with Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I Have
a Dream" speech."
While the African American struggle against slavery and for equality
retains central importance in United States history and in our book, Race
and Races attempts to tell a more comprehensive story of race in the
United States. It is an alternative to the fragmented, separated treatment
that racial topics typically receive, if treated at all, in the law school curriculum (p. 2). As Professor Robert Williams, Jr., notes, we have attempted
to produce a book which presents "multiple race perspectives on American
law," to teach "how the rule of law has been applied to a much broader set
of racial minority groups in this country, and the strategies those groups
have adopted to survive and create a diverse America. 22
We hope to teach students that race has always mattered in the United
States, and that it continues to matter in many ways that they may or may
not have understood before. Some of the most profoundly important events
inthe early history of the colonies and the country were racial events. The
conquest, displacement, and removal of Indians yielded land for the expansion of the colonies, and later the United States (pp. 173-216). The enslavement of Black Africans supplied labor for Southern agriculture (pp.
91-129). We still confront the powerful repercussions of these events today
in Indian claims for self-determination (pp. 220-28) and in African American claims for reparations (p.412).23
One striking way to understand the relevance of race to legal education is to consider the enormous amount of law, assumed to be independent
and unrelated, that nonetheless emerges as closely related when race and
racism are used as organizing principles. For example, law school curricula
20. Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race
Law, 88 CALI. L. REv. 1923, 1927-28 (2000).
21. See A TEsTmErr OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR. 217 (James M. Washington ed., 1991). See also Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary
Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of American Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. L. REv. 1213
(1997); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino-CriticalScholarship,
and the Black-White Binary, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1181 (1997) (noting that equality law, and civil rights
generally, are commonly equated with the African American experience).
22. Robert Williams, Jr., Do You Believe in the Rule of Law?, 89 CALIF. L. REv 1633, 1637
(2001).
23. See, e.g., RANOALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT (2000).
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may typically include separate courses on Indian Law, Immigration Law or
History, Civil Rights, and Equal Protection. These are all treated as separate and discrete disciplines. This curricular separation tends to obscure the
independent significance of race and racism. As Professor Margalynne
Armstrong points out, when students are not exposed to the racial dynamics lurking in these other courses, issues of race and racism that should be
raised are instead ignored. 4
When race and racism are used as lenses through which to view the
law in these traditionally separate subject areas, a unified story of race in
the United States emerges. For example, consider how Europeans sought to
justify the conquest of Indians and the usurpation of Indian lands by presuming the inferiority of Indian peoples. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote
in Johnson v. McIntosh, "the character and religion of [the Indians]
afforded an apology for considering them as a people over whom the
superior genius of Europe might claim an ascendancy" (pp. 175-76).
Europeans justified Black slavery in similar terms. Indeed, abolitionism
and the struggle against Jim Crow included, as central components, challenges to the presumed inferiority of Blacks (pp. 141-56). From 1790 to
1952, immigration law was a remarkable forum for the development and
definition of Whiteness and the exclusion of many non-Whites. In 1790,
the first condition for naturalized citizenship was that one be a "free white
person," presumed to be fit, temperamentally, intellectually, and morally,
to participate in the affairs of government (p. 583). Of course, in Dred
Scott v. Sandford (pp. 123-25), the Supreme Court decided that Africans
and African Americans, whether slave or free, were never intended to be
considered citizens under the federal constitution. During the latter half of
the nineteenth century, the federal courts decided who qualified as a "white
person" for naturalization (pp. 429-33). The courts, including the Supreme
Court, decided that immigrants from China, Japan, India, and other nations
were not "white" and therefore not entitled to citizenship (pp. 429-40).25
Astonishingly, the racial qualification for naturalization remained in place
until 1952.26
Thus, traditional civil rights law and equal protection, Indian law, and
immigration law all form important parts of the history and construction of
racial identities in the United States. Remarkably, even integrating all of
these ostensibly disparate areas of law, one would learn nearly nothing
about Latinos/as." Much of the story of Latinos/as in the United States lies
in the race-based conquest of Mexico and later Puerto Rico, and in the
24. Margalynne Armstrong, Teaching by the Book, 89 CALui. L. REv. 1625, 1626-27 (2001).
25. See also IAN HANEY LOPEZ, Wr-rrE BY LAW (1996).
26. Id. at 49.
27. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 965 (1995) (describing the production of Latino/a invisibility); THE LA-nNO/A CoNDrriON: A
CRITlCAL READER (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998).
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extraordinary legal process through which one-half of Mexico became the
Southwestern United States (pp. 246-97). After the military conquest, this
legal process began with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 (pp.
260-66), and continued with land grant adjudications decided by the Taney
Court and later Courts in the mid-to-late nineteenth century (275-98). Litigation continues even today over the validity of dispositions of Mexican
land grants.28
While White racism has influenced powerfully the destinies of all
people of color in this country, it is important to understand that the forms
that racism takes are not the same with respect to each of the groups affected by it. Including multiple race perspectives in our book provides historical background for understanding the varied ways that racism affected
and affects different communities of color. By giving prominent attention
to the particular histories of the major racial groups in the United States,
including Whites (pp. 429-99),29 we hope to facilitate important comparisons, linkages, and distinctions regarding the conditions faced by the different groups. For example, consider the period 1880-1900. In 1882, antiChinese agitation in California culminated in congressional enactment of
the federal Chinese Exclusion Act, which prohibited the immigration of
Chinese laborers into the United States (pp. 382-84). Subsequently, the
Supreme Court upheld the exclusion acts in 1889 in Chae Chan Ping (p.
384-88). In 1887, Congress passed the General Allotment Act, also known
as the Dawes Act, which destroyed Indian tribal sovereignty by breaking
up lands held jointly by the tribes and allotting these lands in separate parcels to individual tribal members (pp. 215-16). This Act led to reductions
in the land base controlled by Indian tribes. And in 1896, the Supreme
Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson (pp. 142-47),31 upholding and encouraging racial segregation. In 1898, during the Spanish-American War, the
United States conquered Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines and invaded Hawaii (326-28).
Thus, during this twenty-year period, aggressive United States colonialism combined with severe internal repression of racial minorities. Only
by comparing the histories of the different racial groups can one identify
and explain this phenomenon. Indeed, Race and Races illustrates how
United States racial history follows a zigzag path, sometimes forwards,

28. See, e.g., PETER NABOKOV, TUERINA AND THE COURTHOUSE RAID (1969);
Symposium: Understandingthe Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo on its 150th Anniversary, 5 Sw. J. L. &
TRADE AM. 5 (1998).
29. See also CRmcAL W.rrE STtrUDs: LOOKING BEHMIN
THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado &
Jean Stefancic eds., 1997).
30.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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often backwards.3" Readers will also discover how this is not at all accidental.32 Society often arranges it so that one racial group is in favor while
another is intensely repressed.33 Seeing the checkerboard of racial progress
and the way groups are often played off against each other helps the reader
understand the behavior of higher courts today.
Professor Abrams suggests that a chronological sequence might have
been preferable for facilitating such comparisons.34 We respectfully disagree. Part of the aim of providing separate chapters for the major racial
groups was to demonstrate the nature, degree, and particularity of the racism experienced by each and to emphasize the trends and advances just
described. Not all racism is the same, nor has it played out in the same way
for each group. These dynamics and particularities likely would have been
osbscured had we taken a purely chronological approach.
II
RESPONSES TO REVIEWS OF

Race and Races

As Professors Abrams and Yamamoto correctly note, the authors of a
casebook are in a luckier position than most: we have the opportunity to
correct our mistakes in subsequent editions.35 We embrace several goals for
the next edition that the contributors to this colloquy have identified.
Professor Yamamoto suggests a richer chapter on Asian Americans and an
extended treatment of reparations.36 Professor Abrams suggests a sustained
examination of the relationship between race, class, and poverty. We also
take to heart Abrams' suggestion that we pay more attention to lawyering
strategies beyond the strictly conventional and the purely interpersonal.
Beyond these, some of our reviewers raised issues requiring more extensive responses.
A.

ProfessorAbrams

Abrams' suggestion that the book could use "more emphasis on the
affirmative meanings assigned to race"37 is an interesting one. If all
Abrams means by her suggestion is that we could have added material on
the unintended benefits of racial segregation, that is certainly right. Perhaps

31.
See also Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell's Toolkit-Fit toDismantle That Famous House?,75
N.Y.U. L. REv. 283 (2000); CRITiCAL RACE THEORY: THE CtrrriNG EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 1999).
32. Id. at 290-93.
33. Id.at291.
34. See Kathryn Abrams, Race and Races: Constructing a New Legal Actor, 89 CALIF. L. REv.
1589, 1601 (2001).
35. See id.at 1602; Eric K. Yamamoto, Teaching Race Through Law: "Resourcesfor a Diverse
America", 89 CALIF. L. REv. 1641, 1645 (2001).
36. See Yamamoto, supranote 35, at 1645-5 1.
37. See Abrams, supra note 34, at 1599.
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we should have also made more references to the racial pride and kinship
that most people of color feel deeply. But Abrams' comment raises a
deeper question that many have struggled with: are there, in fact,
"affirmative meanings assigned to race"? Certainly as an accidental byproduct, racism has given rise to political solidarity, family feeling among
strangers, a vivid sense of historical connection to those who came before;
vibrant cultural traditions; and deep commitments to justice. But are these
"affirmative meanings assigned to race"? Or are they inherently reactive in
nature? If racism were somehow vanquished, what would be left of race?
Noel Ignatiev, calling for the abolition of the White race, argues that
Whiteness is nothing but the label for unjust privilege (pp. 489-93). Does
"race" itself have content, once it is disentangled from cultural, historical,
and political identity? We think we have done right by not answering these
questions. Indeed, given that racism is unlikely to be eliminated any time
soon, it is not clear that these questions are pressing ones. Instead, since the
central meaning of "race" seems to turn on historically contingent value
judgments, beliefs and faiths that support relationships of differential
power and subordination, our approach has been to examine the nature of
the historical development and expression of these beliefs.
One lesson our book teaches is that the dominant society in practically
every era has assigned positive images to itself and to Whiteness. One
chapter of Race and Races (pp. 429-99), for example, details how color
imagery and invisible privileges provide an "affirmative meaning assigned
to (the white) race" (pp. 464-78). By the same token, popular culture (pp.
959-1016) almost invariably assigns negative meanings and images to
groups of color, except for the rare periods in which it assigns ridiculously
romanticized ones to them such as the noble savage.
Professor Abrams also encourages us in the next edition to address
interminority tensions and conflicts.38 This is a sore point in communities
of color right now. Consider a situation like the controversy over admissions quotas at Lowell High School challenged in Ho v. S.F. Unified
School District (p.745), where tension persists between Asian Americans
and African Americans. We decided the proper role for us as casebook
authors was to discuss the Ho case as an example of the need for negotiation and coalition, and to show that intergroup social dynamics may sometimes be fraught with the same struggles over self-interest as those between
a minority group and the majority. We doubt that it would be wise for us to
do more than this. In particular, we think it would be unwarranted for us to
take a stand on who is right and who is wrong in that controversy. While
intergroup complaints between communities of color might theoretically
rise to such an egregious level that progressive scholars such as ourselves
could not avoid taking a stand, we found no such cases in our research.
38.

Id. at 1601.

HeinOnline -- 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1661 2001

1662

CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 89:1653

Professor Abrams also chides us, somewhat surprisingly, for remaining mired in a Black-White paradigm. 9 This casebook, of course, is the
first expressly to expand beyond that paradigm and consider the racial fortunes, issues, problems, and histories of all the major groups of color in the
United States, and include the construction of Whiteness (pp. 3 04-09, 47177). Thus, practically every chapter on a substantive topic, such as hate
speech or popular culture, devotes attention to all the major groups. However, one of the lessons of the differential racialization thesis is that each of
the groups has been racialized in different, but overlapping, ways (pp. 1-2,
14-15). Thus, for example, immigration and language rights play little role
in Black history. Mexican Americans suffered conquest, but were not enslaved in a literal sense. Accordingly, any organizational scheme that sets
out to march determinedly through a four-part matrix under every single
topic heading would distort history. Thus, we have tried to devote attention
to the rich tapestry of race, realizing that not every strand attaches to every
other.
Professor Abrams also complains that our book is missing a praxis.4"
Robert Williams provides part of the answer to that complaint: Indian
history (like that of most of the groups we consider) teaches legal skepticism.4' We believe that a book that highlights how frail a reed the law has
proven to be for oppressed peoples provides a valuable dose of skepticism
and realism for would-be lawyers. The young lawyer wins cases she knows
she should have lost, loses cases she knows she should have won. Judges
can be biased. Jurors can kowtow to a domineering foreperson. One's clients can lose their nerve or lie. We suspect that law students who take the
time to develop their own radical critique of social institutions, including
the law, will enter practice with a type of psychic armoring that will enable
them to persevere in the face of resistance and disappointment. Perhaps this
is the most valuable praxis lesson of all, and one we very much hope readers will take from our book.
B.

ProfessorAlfieri

Toward the end of his critique, Professor Alfieri poses a curious challenge. "To render prescriptive counsel properly," he writes, Race and
Races' editors "must confront the tension dividing modem and postmodern
' He notes that we appear to both "condemn and
modes of analysis."42
' We also simultaneously "ridicule
exploit the hegemonic logic of law."43
and embrace formalism and process values... [and both] celebrate
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 1600.
Id. at 1601-02.
Williams, supra note 22, at 1634-36.
Anthony Alfieri, Teaching the Law of Race, 89 CALIF. L. REv. 1605, 1624 (2001).
Id.
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multiracial identity and assail" those methods of advocacy that appear to
him incompatible with that identity. He suggests that we are ambivalent
about rights.45 To be sure, Alfieri professes a gracious understanding of our
predicament, for we "labor in the ambiguity of this long moment of
transition."4 6 He concludes by declaring "We should be grateful for their
leadership. We should hope they do not grow weary."'47
We are not weary. However, if we were to set ourselves the task of
reconciling modernism and postmodernism, formalism and its opposite,
multiracialism and conventional Anglocentric advocacy, we might well
grow so. But these are not our tasks. As we imply in the sections devoted
to strategies and methods of reform, we are prepared to embrace an unapologetic eclecticism (pp. 3, 1091-1154). Just as race and racism take different forms at different periods and in relation to different minority
groups, the tools of resistance must likewise vary. In one setting, litigation
may be a perfectly sensible means of confronting a particular evil. In another, litigation may be fruitless; mass demonstration or storytelling48 or
enlistment of race traitors49 may be needed. Some racial roadblocks may
yield to discourse analysis; others may be better addressed by efforts to
change material conditions." In some situations, such as the army or organized sports, formality may guarantee at least a degree of fairness.5 In
others, free-flowing coalition politics and interpersonal friendships may be
what the situation requires.
In short, the traditional either/or categories Alfieri lists are not well
tailored to addressing the vast panoply of race. This is both a disadvantage
and a blessing. Students and fellow travelers cannot tie themselves to a
single theory of race, any more than they can rely on a unitary method of
resistance.
CONCLUSION

The complexity of "race," of "races," and their development and deployment through United States history cannot be confined by simple categories and facile resolutions. Some of the questions raised by our reviewers
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Richard Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionists and Others: A Pleafor Narrative, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2411(1988).
49. On the concept of race traitor, see Race and Races (pp. 489, 493).
50. See Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think About Race: Reflections on the Id, the Ego, and
other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEo. L.J. 2279 (2001); Delgado, TiH LA'rNO/A
CoNDIToN, supra note 27, at 303-45 (describing role of rebellious lawyering and street politics in
effecting reform).
51. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairnessand Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359 (1985).
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allow no easy solutions. Accordingly, the multidisciplinary, historical approach we have taken in the book is pragmatic and eclectic. 2 We have
sought to give voice to stunning silences and omissions of race, to provide
history and resources that we hope will enable us, in Professor
Yamamoto's words, "to 'talk about it."' 53
The perceptive insights of these distinguished reviewers give us much
to think about. We are grateful to them for their knowledge, their insights,
and their criticisms, all of which we find helpful in understanding what our
book means to others and how we can make it better.

52. C.f Catharine Pierce Wells, Why Pragmatism Works for Me, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 347, 353
(2000) ("Good lawyers do not obsessively adhere to a single theory. Instead they try to keep their
minds free so that they are receptive to various ways of formulating the issues."); Margaret Jane Radin,
The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699, 1700 (1990) ("We must look carefully at
the nonideal circumstances in each case and decide which horn of the dilemma is better (or less bad),
and we must keep re-deciding as time goes on.").
53. Yamamoto, supranote 35, at 1651. Even as we write, the conservative American Civil Rights
Coalition, an arm of Ward Connerly's American Civil Rights Institute, has unveiled a new proposed
initiative for the March 2002 California ballot. The measure, titled the "Racial Privacy Initiative,"
would prevent the state from "classify[ing] any individual by race, ethnicity, color or national origin in
the operation of public education, public contracting or public employment." Under the measure, the
state would be prohibited from collecting data about an individual's race on government forms for the
purpose of detecting racial discrimination. Letter from Kevin Nguyen, Executive Director, and M.
Royce Van Tassell, Director of Research, American Civil Rights Coalition, to Tricia Knight, Initiative
Coordinator, Office of the Attorney General of California, 2-3 (Feb. 20, 2001) (on file with authors).
However, police uses of race, including the controversial practice of "racial profiling," would be
specifically exempted from the ban. Letter from Elizabeth B. Guillen, Legislative Counsel, Mexican
American Legal Defense and Education Fund, to Joe Shinstock, California Department of Finance 7-8
(Mar. 14, 2001) (on file with authors) (arguing that law enforcement will, in practice, have a difficult
time distinguishing uses of race authorized by the statute and those not authorized). But see Libertarian
Party, Reviewer's Guide to the "California Racial Privacy Initiative" (Jan. 12, 2001), at
http://www.peoplesveto.org/lp/textfiles/010112%20lnitiative.txt
(claiming that "[s]ince racial
profiling is already illegal, this exemption does not make it legal"). Yet another attempt to make
matters of race unspeakable seemingly awaits in the wings.
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